Bamidele A Ojo teaches African politics, international affairs and human rights at the School of Political & International Studies, Fairleigh Dickinson University. Teaneck, New Jersey. He was a Fulbright Scholar for Teaching and Research (2001-2002) at the University of Lagos. Nigeria. Dr. Ojo was a govenorship candidate for Ekiti state in Nigeria under the ruling People's Democratic Party in 2003

As the issues facing the world community become more complex , the African state by its nature, its place and the condition of the global environment within which it exists, is characteristically enmeshed in a far more serious, challenging and sometimes impossible process of charting an interest-defining and interest-promoting course on the global stage. Although the African state like its counterpart in the rest of the world is pre-occupied with contemporary issues such as security, health care delivery and HIV/AIDS, it is at the same time focused on a more demanding task of economic development, state building, nation building and democratization. The burden imposed by these problems as well as the prevailing internal socio-economic and political decay as recently demonstrated in Darfur in Sudan, the Niger delta in Nigeria and cases in Sierra Leone and Liberia, to mention just a few, preempts any afro-optimism regarding the state of affairs and the prospect for immediate socio-economic and political development on the continent. However, there has also been a shift in scholarly debates on the study of problems facing the continent. The focus is more and more on internal deficiencies within the African state such as the failure of leadership and the question of good governance; this is contrary to earlier studies attributing the undeniable African problems to both colonial and neo-colonial legacies.

This essay is therefore premised on the construct of Africa’s Triple Dilemma, which from an attempt to understand Africa’s preoccupation with state building and democratization in the throes of global transformation. There are three basic, recurring and somehow interdependent variables which by their nature will continue to shape the place of African states in global politics. These variables are, state building, democratization and globalization. Our conclusion is that the process of globalization will challenge the capacity of each African state and its responding ability to promote and sustain the process of state building and democratization. And correspondingly, the capacity for state-building and the ability to consolidate democracy will dictate the nature and extent of African state’s participation in the process of globalization.

The question of state building revolves around the effectiveness of the state and its ability to discharge its responsibility to its citizenry. And, democratization concerns the process of institutional governance which facilitates the effective allocation of resources within a particular geo-political entity and socioeconomic development. All these take place within an environment characterized by globalization which focuses on the ability of the African states to engage in and the extent to which it influences or be influenced, within the global infrastructure. The important role of the African state in the development of the African society, therefore, cannot be over emphasized but what remains as a dominant feature of the last three decades has been the continuing search for a democratic governing structure that will facilitate the socio-political and economic development of the African society. In its totality, the impact of the global system and the direct participation of Africa in global transformation remain important factors in determining the capability of the African state in a world in which its underdevelopment is a by-product of its incorporation into the metropolitan economy in the first place.

Conceptual Framework

The triple dilemma that Africa faces in this century revolves around the effectiveness of the state which in effect is dependent on its degree of democratization. This will in turn provide the foundation for socio-political and economic development, thereby facilitating a more effective, interest-protecting capability in the global transformation process. The African state however has been characterized as soft, collapsed (W. Zartman (ed), 1995), failed (Kelevi J. Holsti, 1996), fractured (Crawford Young, 1994) and more. These characterizations by many outstanding scholars imply either that an African state exhibits European state-like characteristics or that these scholars based their assessment on such a tradition. While these arguments remain tantalizing, I am reluctant to adopt such a characterization because I find it difficult to ignore the characteristics of the pre-colonial state and its impact on the colonial and post colonial state. Some of the aforementioned analysis may have been apropos, but it is incomplete in its understanding of the nature of the African state. And what results from such an analysis is an incomplete understanding of contemporary African state and society. One must therefore ponder the question what is the nature of the pre-colonial state?

The pre-colonial African state predates the birth of the nation state as defined by the Westphalian treaty of 1648. This treaty, marked the beginning of the nation state system in which sovereign political entities, independent of any outside authorities, exercised control over people residing in separate territories with officially marked boundaries (Peter J. Schraeder, 2000:62). The African states of Axum (100-700AD), Kush (800BC-350AD), Ghana (Old Ghana Empire (700-1200 AD), Mali (1200-1500 AD) and Songhai (1350-1600 AD), for example, predated the treaty and many other sovereign states that followed later like the Benin (1500-1800AD), the Oyo empire (1600-1850AD), Buganda (1600-1900AD) and Kanem Borno (800-1900AD), to mention just a few, all demonstrated some of these characteristics. The scramble for Africa and its resulting colonization and re-organization of territorial boundaries under the new colonial infrastructure, does not in any way render inconsequential what these states were. What actually happened as a result of the imposition of the European nation state system is that the artificially created state was in no way sovereign because its sovereignty remain in the hands of the occupying power. Unlike their European counterparts, the African states did not represent the wishes of the African people in their time. The debate about the state in Africa assumes that the state did not exist in the sense propre until the end of colonial rule. It is extremely inadequate to assume non-existence of the state during the pre-colonial and colonial period and to then expect a functional state at the inception of independence. There is no doubt that what started at independence is a continued process of state formation which is characterized as nation building. It could also be argued that independence marked the morphing of the state into European-type modern states in Africa. And at that same point reintegrating the pre-colonial with the post-colonial aspects of the state. The period of colonial governance served as a period of interruption, which clearly muddled the process of state building and national identification as a result of political reorganization and administrative engineering resulting from the Berlin conference and on. This situation is well captured by Crawford Young, when he says that “if we hold the colonial state up to the mirror of “state”, we find that the reflection is flawed. Of the defining attributes of stateness, three crucial elements are missing. Sovereignty was emphatically denied; this comprehensive, ultimate power was vested in the colonizing state, delegated to its agents of rule. The doctrine of nation, redolent with overtones of self-determination, was vigorously disputed by the proprietary power until the eve of their departure. And the colonial state was not an actor in the international scene; at most, it was occasionally a stage hand. The question may arise as to whether the colonial polity merits the dignity of recognition as a state” (Crawford Young,1994:43). It couldn’t have been said better: if the mirror of the state was Eurocentric, the phenomenon of colonization was also Euro imposed. Colonialism interrupted the natural process of African “stateness” and henceforth deconstructed the African state and inevitably set in motion the process of the Europeanization of the state that may eventually be formed.

The State IN Africa

In line with our previous posit, there is a predominance of Eurocentric analysis of the nature of the state in Africa. Max Weber provides the bench mark for most contemporary analysis of the state by attributing to the state the following properties: a) its unchallenged control of the territory within the defined boundaries under its control: b) its monopolization of the legitimate use of force within its borders: and 3) its reliance upon impersonal rules in the governance of its citizens and subjects (Harberson & Rothchild, 2000:7) This construct has also been extended by Charles Tilly who includes membership in a system of states as a requisite for stateness (Tilly 1992.) This was further reinforced by others such as William Reno, Christopher Clapham and Robert Jackson. Tilly also includes a state capacity to extract resources for its own support as an important requirement for statehood while Crawford Young developed the notion of stateness to include rational rule-making. According to Harberson and Rothchild, other properties of the African state should also include, favorable patterns of ethnic relations, the reduction of corruption, the strengthening of civil society, the reform and liberalization of economic policies, an emphasis on the doctrine of state responsiveness to legitimate public demands, respect for civil rights, the reliance upon the emergence of more capable leaders and the expansion of democratization. The list could go on and on based on the problems afflicting African states today.

The question of sovereignty is also a significant characteristic of the state while maintaining law and order within its territory. Most, if not all, the pre-colonial states in Africa displayed these attributes prior to European colonization. A state must also develop a “raison d’etre”, which should be based on the notion of a particular entity as a nation. A sense of nationalism must be developed through that state’s ability to maintain security throughout its territory. A state must also be capable of enjoying a relationship with other states in the international system. As an idea, the state must promote effective orientation and images and expectations among its citizens. These capabilities are in many cases derived from the function of a state as an historical factor which has been sustained in the memory of its citizenry. While it is imperative that the notion of a state’s sovereignty be capable of ensuring the supremacy of the state’s authority, it should also be sustained through policy initiatives. A predominant aspect of the “state talk” focuses on the question of legitimacy, whereby the state must be able to sustain its authority through securing consent for its rules in the exercise of its authority.

The state through this legitimate authority will be able to command some degree of power. This is its power to engage in activities to sustain its capacity to command loyalty and to authoritatively allocate resources within the society. The “state talk” also involves an agreed notion that the people are not necessarily consulted about whether they choose to be a party to a social contract (Richard Muir 1997) but some of these notions have changed over time and will continue to change given the changing nature of the state and its function in contemporary politics. But an important aspect of the ability of the state to sustain the support of the people within its boundaries is by setting the extent of geographical or territorial extension of its authority. According to Camilleri and Falk, “the spatial question of the state, understood as a geometric entity with precisely demarcated boundaries, is integral to the notion of sovereignty and to international relations theory (Camilleri, JA and Falk J, 1992). The voluntary nature of the contract freely entered into by the population of a state is also a significant aspect of statehood, because by its established sovereign power, the state offers the people protection from violence and disorder and by so doing serves as a neutral empire and arbiter presiding over disputes and supporting the common good (Camilleri and Falk, 1992:83). This particular notion of the state is undermine by the experience of the African state as a result of colonial rule. Many ethnic groups (of nations) are forced to live together and hence remain unable to believe or accept the state’s role as an impartial arbiter in the distribution of the common good. This is a result of colonial manipulation and manipulation by the immediate post-colonial leadership of the ethnic divide within respective states.

The state serves as a protector because it protects the majority from arbitrary usurpation by socially and economically powerful groups, other than those allied to their state. Subsequently, it seeks to integrate conflicting elements of the national community and to bind them together into a coherent unit. And the legitimate authority of the state within its territory is measured by its strength (Kelevi Holsti 1999:90). According to Kelevi Holsti, “the state may be placed on a continuum of strength, at one extreme are the strong states whose main features are strong linkages between the population, attitudinal and institutional components, all encompassed within high degrees of vertical and horizontal legitimacy” (p.90). He also placed on the other extreme, failed states or other political entities that have collapsed. Under this scenario, the legitimacy of the state is performance based, in which case, the state maintains its right to rule through the provision of services including security, law and order, justice and a varying range of welfare measures (p91). This argument presumes a contractually based interaction, whereby the state exerts its right to extract resources for the provision of services. But it could also be argued that the lack of international legitimacy may in the present world order undermine domestic legitimacy and vice -versa. The question therefore revolves around the effectiveness of the post-colonial state in Africa and its capacity to perform those functions that confer authority upon it. It also means that any deficiency resulting from the inadequacy of its formation could easily challenge its appropriateness as a state especially within the confines of the definitional parameters presented above. But these parameters are informed by a faulty precept because the African state was not formed with the objective of assuming and exhibiting those properties. It came into being as a result of the demand for independence and the desire to set a goal of self-determination for a people. And at the point of its “naissance”, the objective was not to address the question of ethnic loyalty, leadership corruption or any other problems that may result from inherited poverty and a dependent economy. Nor was the state established to sustain democracy, since the colonial state was not democratic and there were no infusion of any form of democratic ideal or institutions in these states prior to the assumption of office by the new leaders. The relationship between the leaders and the people was imposed and not mutual. The relationships between the different ethnic groups were imposed and neither were they mutual. The onset of independence was to inform and grow the relationship, however ill-conceived it might have been and however disproportionate it might be. For the new state, there is therefore no room for failure in any of the areas of expectations and in the performance of its responsibility and the sustenance of its properties. A failure or deficiency in one or any of these properties as illustrated by many scholars will automatically spell trouble for the state. The problems associated with state performance to date in many African countries should not surprise anyone at all. It is a logical outcome for many of these states trying to establish their raison d’etre. From Nigeria with the Biafran crisis, to the crisis in Sierra Leone; from the crisis in Somalia to the current malaise in Sudan; and from the genocide in Rwanda to the constant and unpredictable civil discord in Zaire: African states continue to search for the appropriate process of performing their functions, albeit ineffectively, within contemporary global landscape.

Democratization

The questions of democracy and democratization reverberate more often than ever before within contemporary discourse of the African state and society. The consolidation of democracy is recognized as one of the most important solutions to the problems facing the continent today. Some sees democracy as the process of choosing any competing candidates and following prescribed procedures for doing it. It is also a process associated with equality within a polity. While emphasis is placed on the rights and liberties of the individual, another contending variable of democracy is the predominance of the welfare of the collective (the community) which must be valued over any individual benefits. It is difficult to ascertain the exactness of democracy in as much as it progressively evolves. A democracy is constantly evolving as it seeks to maintain a reasonable standard of living for its citizenry. It is also a product of the socio- political environment within which it exists. The mere adoption (or importation) of democratic ideas and/or institutions does not necessarily guarantee effective take-off of democracy. The adoption of a political system within a state may however facilitate an open and equal participation for its citizenry. It, in essence, must guarantee a periodic election based on free choice and provide for the protection of the fundamental human rights of all within its boundaries. Much like the debate about the conceptualization of the state, democracy and democratization carries different interpretations. Although there have been different waves of democratization across the globe, not until the end of the cold war in the late 1980s did it involve the African state .Considered the third wave, it wasn’t until this current wave that democracy demonstrated “a global aspiration, irrespective of religion, culture and levels of development” and not until then could we “speak of democratization in Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, China and Russia” (Jean Grugel 2002:2). With this, democratization gained global primacy and became an important tool for the analysis of the contemporary world (McGrew 1997:21). According to Jean Grugel (2002) in his excellent work on democratization, two features of the global order have been important for understanding contemporary processes of democratization: the creation of a global economy and the end of the Cold War.

While these events created opportunities for democratization, they also signifies the ascendancy of the capitalist, already democratic west and an international order predicated upon western dominance (:3) And as Grugel aptly puts it, the process is a reflection of an unequal global order predicated upon western political, cultural and economic supremacy. Analysis of democratization (Diamond 1999; Remmer 1997; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Linz and Stephan 1996; Beetham 1992) has been done along a continuum from a minimal to a maximalist position. The positioning will start from the minimalist to the left, which will see democratization as the regular holding of clean elections and the introduction of basic norms (such as absence of intimidations, inclusive suffrage, among others) that make free election possible. Others may include a broader perspective which involves an introduction and extension of citizenship rights and the creation of a democratic state. It may also include the elimination of socio-economic inequality because poverty and social exclusion serve as real barriers to citizenship.

Modelski and Perry III, on the other hand see democratization as a process of building, or creating, democracy and also a process which moves along two distinguishable, if related, paths: wherever democratic techniques of macrodecision are discovered and spread, a process of diffusion of these innovations occurs. They also see it as the process by which democratic communities grow, via a form of clustering (or concentration) into larger communities of democracy; for the evolution of new types of community, too, is a form of innovation (Modelski, G. & Perry III, G., 1991:2). They also see democratization as a time-bound process as they “do not expect it to be completed, all at once, world wide, but rather in stages, gradually, and slowly at first. In a report on democratization, Boutros Boutros-Ghali described democratization as a process which leads to a more participatory, less authoritarian society but which also take many forms and evolves through many phases, depending on the particular characteristics and circumstances of societies, and which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanism, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people (Boutros Boutrous-Ghali, 1996,).

From the above, it is more than obvious that there are different views of democratization derived from democracy which itself is very problematic because of the variation in interpretation. One view emphasizes the existence of socioeconomic equity and another popular participation in free and fair elections as well as measures for substantial protection of minorities (Mahmood Monshipouri, 1995:15). Robert A Dahl in a procedural minimum tradition emphasizes the procedures that must be present for the effective operation of modern political democracy. These procedures are: frequent and fair elections, the right to vote, and the right to form relatively independent associations and organizations. Dahl considers the relative influence of the average citizen as the basic definition (Robert A. Dahl, 1971). But the tendency to focus on holding elections has been criticized by some scholars who believe that such a definition would mean that some militarized countries of Central America would fit the parameters of democracy. According to Terry Lynn Karl, an effective definition of democracy must go beyond the holding of elections to include other components such as participation of the citizenry through associational and collective actions, the accountability of rulers and civilian control over the military (Terry Lynn Karl, 1990:1-2). For our analysis in this piece, democracy will be seen in both procedural and substantive terms. It will be seen as encompassing a set of institutional arrangements (i.e, elections, political parties, an independent judiciary, minority rights and the rule of law),are structures and processes for the promotion of socioeconomic justice and economic and social equality.

Given our choice of definition of democracy, our conception of democratization would involve successive stages of transition, endurance and consolidation. This process will ultimately lead to both institutionalization and consolidation of democratic structures and conditions conducive to structural transformation and change from the authoritarian regime. It is based on individual involvement in the political process which will in turn enhance the accountability and responsiveness of government. With such levels of participation, economic and social development become meaningful and establish deeper roots. Building democratic institutions therefore helps to ensure that the priorities of diverse social groups are considered in the formulation of development strategies. Democratization in this case also means building a democratic state, and doing so means institutional change (the form of the state), representative change (who has influence over policies and to whom is the state responsible?) and functional transformation (what the state does or the range of state responsibilities) (Jean Grugel 2002:70). It is obvious that no state is fully democratic but the process of democratization requires a transformation to the visible structures of the state, and this same process can be hindered by the difficulties of institutional reforms, the prevalence of non-democratic cultures, and elite opposition. The abuse of power by transition elites and corruption within the society can limit democratization. Democratic deficits can also be caused by ethnic differences or nationality problems, diminished sovereignty, poor state capacity, and authoritarian legacies. Many African states which have also made the transition from military dictatorship to democracy suffer from the residues of the military culture in terms of policy initiatives, practices and decision making process (Bamidele A Ojo, (ed.), 1999:chap. III). In Nigeria for example, not only has the military chaperoned the new democratic experiment but many of the military leaders also made the transition as the new democratic elite (Bamidele A. Ojo (ed.), 2001, chap. III). As Grugel rightly put it, democratization involves a transformation in the way the state takes and implement decisions but it is not a complete break with the past and the drive to reform the state is frequently blocked by interests embedded within it. And the way the state behaves after transition, then, is dependent at least as much on the weight of the past as it is on the imperative for change (Jean Grugel, 2002:85).

Democratizing states will continue therefore to exhibit non-democratic traits in as much as the past continue to shape the culture, legality, composition and the direction of the new state. The impact of the past on the process of democratization is well demonstrated in the case of both Namibia and South Africa, where the post-apartheid states continue to grapple with the problems created by the past apartheid regimes (Bamidele A. Ojo(ed),1999:chap.VI & VIII). O’Donnell (2000) also shows how the weight of the past constrains the democratization of the state in Latin America. The impact of economic reforms instituted on the advice of the World bank or the International Monetary Fund in the form of structural adjustment (with conditionality) and the issue of foreign debts, undermines the sovereignty of these states and results in political fallout which rattles the fragile process of democratization. These problems limit the democratization process and, because the state tends to be organized around the spoils of politics, result in economic and leadership crisis leading sometimes to the implosion of the state. The democratization process on its own also generates pressures because of increasing demand for political participation and high expectations. These high expectations are met with a lower capacity by the state leading to disenchantment and lack of support from the population which is a by product of a perceived absence of democratic dividends. The democratization process in Africa is therefore subjected to the obstacles directly resulting from the nature of the African state and the composition of the African society. The prevailing uncertainty surrounding the democratization of the African state is inevitable and it will dictate its capacity in the global transformation process.

Globalization

As the African state copes with the challenges of democratization, it is also saddled with dealing with the consequences of an increasing economic interdependence, globalization, a relative loss of fiscal control and the growing authority of markets (Castells 1996; Held et al, 1999).The third challenge facing Africa is globalization. As a process involving being part of the global community through reception and export of certain attributes, accepted all over the world, globalization is associated with deterritorialization, according to which a growing variety of social activities takes place irrespective of the geographical location of participants. It is also linked to the growth of social interconnectedness across existing geographical and political boundaries. This phenomenon also includes reference to the speed and velocity of social activity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2002). From the above and much like the two other variables, globalization lacks precise definition. But it captures elements of a widespread perception that there is a broadening, deepening and speeding up of world-wide interconnectedness in all aspects of life, from cultural to criminal, the financial to the environmental.

According to James Mittelman, globalization sets in train conflicts among competing capitalisms, generates deeper or reconfigured intraregional disparities, engenders interregional rivalries among neomercantilist coalitions and has combined with local forces to consign, at the end of the last millennium, 265 million people on one continent to poverty, with little hope for escape in sight. The foremost contradiction of our time is the conflict between the zones of humanity integrated in the global division of labor and those excluded from it (James Mittelman 1996, p18). The inherent “civilizational” mentality of globalization and the apparent conflict resulting therefrom are also very potent aspects of this phenomenon. Globalization and globalism were both products of specific historical conditions in the last three decades of the twentieth century. Both emerged in the advanced capitalist societies and “with the knowledge, prestige, and resources present in these societies they were disseminated as objective truths among these societies’ subordinate classes and to peoples in the rest of the world (Robert W. Cox, 1996.p.24). Robert Cox reaffirms Mittelman’s contention when he says further, “...globalization widened the gap in living conditions between most of the world’s population and the relatively small segment integrated into global production and financial networks”. To him, globalism also raised the ethical question of what the rich, who were already consuming the lion’s share of the world’s resources and had done most of the polluting, could offer to meet the aspirations of the poor for development and higher living standards (24).

In his own analysis, Ulrich Beck sees globalization as the process through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transitional actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks (Ulrich Beck,2000:11) But the debate on globalization is well summed up as a “prism in which major disputes over the collective human condition are now refracted: questions of capitalism, inequality, power, development, ecology, culture, gender, identity, population, all come back in a landscape where “globalization did it”” (Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 2004:7) There is a general consensus that globalization a) is being shaped by technological change; b) involves the reconfiguration of states (Ohmae 1992); c) goes together with regionalization; and d) is uneven. But the controversies over globalization range from what is globalization and how important it is, to questions about the politics and direction of globalization. It is multidimensional and thus leads to differences in perspectives. There is economic globalization, which is referred to as corporate globalism, and there is political globalization, which is the extension of multilateralism, and is different from cultural globalization. There is also controversy over the timing of globalization, as some scholars sees it as a recent process (economist) while others see it as a long term historical process. This is reinforced by the fact that globalization is not a uniform process. It affects some people more than others and can have very different consequences for people in different settings (Robert Schaeffer1997).

Globalization is also characterized as an “assortment of changes in politics, business, health, entertainment, wherein modern industries has established a world market” and as a “world wide reformation of cultures, a tectonic shifts of habits and dreams “(National Geographic, August, 1999, Vol.196 #2). But from this type of loose definition one is made to believe that there is a free movement of cultures, ideas, people and goods in such a way as to create a mutual interdependence among global inhabitants. Is this really true, or is it simply a renaissance of western values and cultural expansionism, in a different time and with faster communication technology? Global communication and interaction are far more complex than they used to be and the exploitation and conquest of the mind no longer needs physical transport to foreign land and can be carried out in the comfort of one’s own house. While industrialization furthered the conquest of distant lands, the technological revolution of today has reduced the ability of distant cultures to resist domination thereby enhancing global transformation. As global economy has developed, so has the notion of self-sufficiency been reduced.

Of relevance to our analysis is the perspective that this neo-imperialist phenomenon involves a socio-political and economic transformation dominated by cultures and ideas from developed countries at the expense of the less developed ones. Globalization involves the process of economic linkages which heighten cultural diffusion. Globalization is also an organization of activities throughout the world which invariably creates and reduces the whole globe as one place. In spite of this homogenization, globalization endangers contradictory reactions leading to fragmentation of cultures. The fragmentation results not only from the schism created by the global diffusion which has pitted the new found culture, economy and institutions against their local or domestic and preexisting counterparts. Globalization also leads to polarization within and between countries. The social stratification created by this phenomenon can be divided into three levels. At the top are people integrated firmly into the global economy who direct the activities within it. This level involves everyone from the global economy managers down to the relatively privileged workers who serve global production and finance in reasonably stable jobs; the second level includes those who serve the global economy in more precarious employment-expanding categories segmented by race, religion, and sex as a result of the ‘restructuring” of production by post-Fordism. The bottom level consists of superfluous labor-those excluded from the global economy and who serve it only as a potentially destabilizing forces; this level is the object of global poverty relief and riot control (Robert W. Cox, 1996.). Africa and many if not all the countries of the third world fall into the third level. The loss of the autonomous regulatory power of the state is also another contradiction because of the reduction in the power of the state to shield its economy from global influences.

What makes globalization more of a vehicle for promoting inequality is the widespread and uneven tendency toward decomposition of civil society. But globalization is not inevitable, nor is it an unmixed blessing in terms of development. According to Gary Gereffi, its foundations are political as well as economic and therefore far from stable. Furthermore, globalization also generates substantial social and cultural resistance because of its uneven and in some cases marginalizing consequences within as well as between countries and regions (Gary Gereffi, 1996:78.) While there is a wide ranging interpretation of globalization on one hand there is also a mosaic explanation of the process itself on the other. The process involves changes in the organization of production, consumption and other aspects of social relations which by the very nature of its transference, “compression of the time-space aspects of social relations’ as Fantu Cheru calls it, allows the economy, politics, culture and ideology of one country to penetrate another (Fantu Cheru, 1996.145). This process of rapid inter-penetration of social relations (such as world industries, labor flows, lending institutions, communications, scientific and information technologies as well as new cultural norms) makes national borders less relevant while severing family ties and undermining established authority and straining local community bonds.

The interpretation of the global transformation process also involves the emergence of global consciousness. This is a variant of westernization which reaffirm to many, the movement towards convergence (Pye, 1990) and the triumph of liberal values (though with resistance from other civilizations) (Huntington, 1993). But Mustapha Kamal Pasha and Ahmed I. Samatar, in The Resurgence of Islam, situate globality as a feature of modernity and as a product of a long historical exchange between different cultures, including elements that draw their inspiration from the islamic civilization. To them, Falk’s distinction between two types of globalization allows a useful framework to identify the aggressive and reactive dimensions of globalization both interacting with one another as they condition the life situation of individuals and collectivities (Falk, 1992b). They are referring to what Falk called, the first type: globalization-from -above and the second type: globalization-from -below. The first type, globalization -from-above reflects “the collaboration between leading states and the main agents of capital formation, with its key feature being a relentless drive for accumulation under girded by a consumerist ethos; its chief actors being transnational capital and transnational political elites. Both of which together, create a powerful momentum that leaves behind a high degree of seemingly functional integration and at face value, homogenizing habits that makes all other cultures submit to the pervasiveness of the West’s perception of the world and its conception of lived reality (Falk, 1992b).

But globalization-from-below on the contrary, indicts the dysfunctional and degenerative consequences of the phenomenon by pointing to a corrosiveness of autonomy, and of individual and group efficacy, which weakens the local bases of material sustenance and results in the diminution of ecological values and the breakdown of cultural foundations (Falk, 1992b). Contrary to Falk’s hypothesis, globalization is one type not two. It is a singular process with dual interactive activities existing within it. The dual interaction represents therefore what Falk calls globalization- from- above and globalization-from -below. To accept Falk’s interpretation is to accept that the civilizations from below actually engage in the process in a manner similar to that of the civilization from above. The societies from below are incapable of doing so and what Falk describes is simply the effect of globalization from above, the only globalization there is.

The clash of values is a product of interaction between external and domestic values because not all aspects of the society are receptive to change. So globalization in Africa creates contradictions within the African state which in turn impact the process of democratization. These three variables therefore are interdependent. And as a result of this, the propensity for African states to democratize is directly related to the nature and strength of the particular state and the level of its activity and participation in the global market place. We have observed that the state is characterized by the extent of its sovereignty; its ability to maintain security and promote the well being of its people within its polity is directly related to the level of democratic institutionalization which in turn is measured by the level of justice, sustainable equality and protection of fundamental rights, all of which facilitate political and economic participation. The interactions between the three variables are very important. The state’s ability to sustain nation building is directly related to its ability to promote its interests in the process of globalization. There are two levels in the process of interaction: the upper level, which is occupied by those state capable of promoting their interest and measured by the economic and political influence; and the lower level, which is occupied by the absorbed and less important states, which are incapable of promoting their interests. The determinant of the level a state belongs to is dependent on the nature of that state and how it resolves the question of democracy, which is directly linked to the productive capacity of such a state. But the metropolitan economy controls the global market place and by so doing dominates the process of globalization and therefore occupies the upper level in this process.

The African Dilemma

The problem of the state in Africa stems from the European incursion and the lack of survival of the pre-colonial state structures. This situation led to the reordering of the socio-political and economic aspects of the society. The predicament of the African state did not start at independence but began as a result of the African state’s inability to defend itself, maintain its authority, and to protect its population during the colonial period. The colonial powers were not interested in state making and did not need any legitimacy or the approval of local populations. They were established as instruments for extracting resources. They lacked legitimacy and cannot be described as states per se. As a result of this quasi- state situation, the colonial authority makes the ethnic groups the sole repository of power, loyalty and legitimacy. The ethnic groups therefore assumed a far more important role during the colonial state and continue to do so today. The current wave of democratization faces a tremendous challenge because of the direct connection between the process and the degree of legitimate authority within the state. In order for the state to successfully develop the right condition within which to sustain democracy, it must be perceived by the population as the protector of their interests and in order for the state to sustain the process it must also establish a level of trust between itself and the people. This seemingly endless dance of death is compounded by global transformation which imposes additional stress on the legitimate authority of the state. The effective participation in the global environment promotes sustainable growth in these societies, which is impossible to attain because of the nature of the new African states.

The African state is limited in its ability to compete. The African state is not soft or weak nor has it collapsed but it is a state in the process of being. It is in the process of re- inventing itself which is compromised by the changing nature of the global system and the speed of the change. Many Africanists contend that the current spate of global transformation is nothing but a re-colonization process that not only democratizes dis-empowerment but facilitates the sustenance of the status quo (Claude Ake, 1996). The question of nationhood has not been about how to define nation per se but how to effectively utilize the state to recreate or redefine itself as a representative of all. Sometimes it is difficult to perceive the problem because we have assumed the inevitable dominance of the ideas newly adopted from abroad or imposed by the previous colonial administrations. Normally a state develops its attributes over time, after it must have impressed its relevance and value in the memory of its citizens. No wonder it has taken the United States, United Kingdom or France, such a long time to be able to maintain the degree of democratic postures that they have assumed today. For the African state, the pre-colonial state was terminated by the colonial state, which represented a disconnection between the people that it dominated and had no interest in ever protecting them, except when its lucrative economic infrastructure was in danger. The succeeding post-colonial state lacks a history and has no connection to the pre-colonial state, except some values dynamic enough to resist the years of colonial domination. The post colonial state is therefore in flux, in a process of integrating a non- native value system and infrastructure, in an un-comprehensive domestic environment. Those institutions that have survived colonial domination exist in contradiction to newly adopted European values. The level of confusion is enormous and undermines the successful assertion of the new state structure because of the lack of trust and the disconnect inherited from the colonial experience. For example, the extended family system remains a critical support for the individual within an African societal setting but in the context of modern Africa, it is inherently injurious to the survival of the individual, and the need to eliminate this support system, creates problems in the attempt to build a vibrant and united community. Another example can be found in the redundant role of the traditional institutions and values in modern Africa. For hundreds of years, these institutions and values provided legitimacy for the state and the spiritual identity for the relation between the governed and the governor; but today, they have remained irrelevant and in time of crisis are unable to sustain the people in their search for answers to the challenges of the modern state within which they exist.

Conclusion

One can assume that since the African state is in a process of finding a common denominator through which it can reinvent itself, it has in no way reached a catastrophic level of failure but rather is actively trying to contend with the changing socio-political and economic changes of the global system. Under this scenario, there is definitely hope for Africa. The levels of participation in the process of global transformation can be described as assertive participatory level and receptive participatory level. The participation at either level is conditioned by the nature and effectiveness of the state in identifying and defining its interest in the global system and the capability of the participant state to promote such an interest. Given the limitations identified in this piece, African states occupy the lower level of interaction, otherwise referred to as the receptive participatory level. It is a reactive level with little or no influence or capacity to promote its interest in the global environment. On the other hand, most western countries participate at the assertive level wherein the process and the nature of global transformation are determined. The conclusion of this piece is that unless the African state can effectively and independently define its interests in the global environment as a first step toward protecting and promoting these interests, there is no way it can benefit from the global transformation. Globalization for Africa, will no doubt bring more imperial influence and dominance. It will represent a deliberate reduction in African values and institutions at the expense of the expanding European values. The contradiction resulting from the competition and the frustration from incompetence will continue to undermine the process of state building and further dissipate the capacity of the African state to make necessary socio-political and economic progress. The solution therefore lies within the global community itself. Just like colonialism created its own contradiction through the education and missionary activities that led to the emancipation of western educated elites, who then motivated the nationalist drive that led to the end colonization, the democratization process as an integral part of the global phenomenon, will serve as the saving grace capable of supporting an African progressive revival to claim its place in the global market place. It is bound to lead to the democratization of the international system, which will acknowledge its inadequacies and attempt to correct it.

Note: . want to thank Dr Francis Ingledew for his suggestions and review of the initial draft of this paper.

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