Most contemporary writings on globalisation have pointed to the primacy of global forces. They suggest that these global forces are overwhelming and states have no choice but to capitulate in the face of such an onslaught. Of late, a genre of writers, rooted in post-structuralism, have agued that whilst the impulse of globalisation is critical, there are indeed more enriching, interesting, exciting, relevant, reflective analyses emanating from probing the silences of globalisation. As critical and useful as these accounts may be, their analyses centred around the local and everyday may paradoxically be disempowering as all social and cultural forces are now denuded of anything but self-referential context. In this context, politics is both passé and imagined, leaving us no ability to 'speak' or to 'act', only that of explaining. Transposed globally, it leaves global capital tremendous leverage as it seeks and acts on specific sites to feed and replenish itself. This paper accordingly argues that rather than merely 'deconstructing' the world, it is also necessary to provide a critically engaged alternative. In examining Malaysia and its practices, this paper suggests that much useful analytical insights may be learnt from Malaysia's sometimes robust engagements with the west and global forces. The paper argues that a closer study of Malaysia's history and its engagement with the 'west' and globalisation reveals a more nuanced and sophisticated response by the Malaysian state to the exigencies of globalisation. Instead, it has been more considered and involves selectively appropriating 'western' discourses and modernity. In so doing, the Malaysian state has been able to redefine its relationship with globalisation and accorded for itself a degree of autonomy and self-determination enabling it to acquire much symbolic and political capital from its proclamations and posturings. The Malaysian case serves to remind us that states continue to matter despite the seemingly unstoppable force of globalisation and that imaginative and alternative practices and strategies can be crafted within the interstices of global capitalism.
In recent years, Malaysia, a small country with about 23 million people, has attracted much academic and analytical traction. Over the last twenty years, the figure of the recently retired Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad looms large, for despite much vilification from mainstream 'western' media, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, more than any other politician, has consistently critiqued the 'west' for its arrogance, double standards, and discoursed on a new colonialism. Malaysia's position during the recent 1997 Asian financial crisis won both admirers and detractors. Detractors proclaimed its naiveté , abdication of neo-classical market approaches and Malaysia's human rights record, including its detention and internment of its then sacked deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. Admirers pointed to Mahathir's independence, anti-colonial position and the enablement of an alternative voice within the global matrix of realist politics. Malaysia's managing of the crisis under Mahathir, for example, challenged prevailing economic orthodoxy of liberalization and pointed the way to an alternative practice of national policy autonomy in the face of a seemingly unstoppable global tsunami of liberalisation.
The Malaysian experience suggests that contrary to globalisation enthusiasts, alternatives exist but more importantly, they also point to the continuing efficacy and resilience of national policies and states. In this article, I seek to examine the notion of globalisation and its mediation within the Malaysian context. As such, in the first part of this article, I will examine the discourse of globalization and the processes through Malaysia engaged therewith. The paper argues that rather than merely pursuing the predominant discursive 'politics of ressentiment' strategy deployed by 'third world' representatives, Mahathir skillfully deployed and mobilized key critical discursive practices to enlarge space for itself and also claimed an authoritative voice in the global geo-political economy. The article also argues that contrary to popular perceptions, that Malaysia under Mahathir has historically welcomed, cultivated and promoted 'globalisation'. This reception is, however, selective and ambivalent and in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, became increasingly more vocal when Malaysia felt itself 'betrayed' by global market forces. As Malaysia took steps to defend its economy, globalisation was accordingly 'reframed' and its resonance has an impact and relevance transcending the Malaysian case.
Globalisation has become the defining analytical concept for practitioners and analysts of the global economy. For its proponents, it is an inevitable and unstoppable force; it marks the relentless march of a globally integrated market and its associated practices. As such, Held, et al., proclaim globalisation to be 'a process (or set of forces) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power' (Held et. al., 1999: 16). Held's analysis provides a historical periodisation of different forms of globalisation. For them, there is a qualitative change from previous episodes - it is marked by increasing American hegemony, a new international division of labour, ever tightening systems of economic regulation (first via the Bretton Woods system and more recently, through the World Trade Organisation) in conjunction with a growing neo-liberal world order (see also Dicken, 1992; Hoogvelt, 1997). The latter is marked by the growth and critical import of financial capital, attended to by technological and also political forces (Strange, 1986; Helleiner, 1994). The increasing mobility of financial capital, particularly its speed and volume, has brought grave concerns to national economies for these economies are often dwarfed by and hostage to these capital flows. This is true for comparatively small economies like Malaysia but equally true for large economies like the USA where stock trading controls kicks in after a defined fall in the market. And yet, as I have pointed out, globalisation is multi-dimensional. In the case of Malaysia, there is a broad consensus that globalisation is not a uniform concept. For some, it is the presence of foreign multinationals, brands and lifestyles; for others it is the Internet, Astro (satellite television), the ties of the Malays and its greater Islamic ummah (the family of Muslims), the rising significance of international non-governmental organizations and Malaysia's exposure and vulnerability to global flows and vectors of capital and labour, amongst other possible developments. Clearly, globalisation has far-reaching effects and is embedded in Malaysians' daily lives.
Traditionally open to international capital, the Malaysian government augmented its integration into the global economy firstly via an embrace of export-led growth strategy (encapsulated in the establishment of free trade zones in the state of Penang in 1969) and the opening up of socio-cultural discourses in the 1970s. Debates about the position of the Malays and their cultural dispositions, the new 'mental revolution' required for social and economic transformation (Mohamad, 1970; Rahman Senu, 1971) and the increasingly enlarged role of the state coincided with Malaysia's increasing involvement regionally and internationally (including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group and the United Nations).
This growing internationalisation received a fillip when Dr. Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981. Via a spate of policy pronouncements and reforms, Malaysia adopted a series of neo-liberalising economic measures, including privatization of state utilities, changes in its tax regime (through cuts in direct and corporate taxes) and cuts in state expenditures. The market was embraced as the engine of growth and seen to be the moderating force shaping development in the country. Thus, for example, in the Sixth Malaysia Plan, the government readily proclaimed in 'The Way Forward' that '(o)ur economic objective should be to secure the establishment of a competitive economy…It must mean, among other things: a diversified and balanced economy with a mature and widely based industrial sector, a modern and mature agriculture sector and an efficient and productive and equally mature services sector; …an entrepreneurial economy that is self-reliant, outward looking- and enterprising;…an economy that is subjected to the full discipline and rigour of market forces…For the foreseeable future, Malaysia will continue to drive the private sector, to rely on it as the primary engine of growth' (Malaysia, 1990: 3, 5). Malaysian companies were exhorted 'to be more lean, more resourceful, more productive and generally more competitive, more able to take on the world' (ibid: 154).
The economy accordingly expanded, registering annual growth rates of around 8%-9%. Foreign investment also rose significantly, rising from RM 325 million in 1985 to RM 6.2 billion in 1990. As the economy expanded, the process of globalisation intensified - labour and capital regulations were also liberalized. By 1995, foreign capital became the most important factor contributing to growth in Malaysia and Malaysia became one of the more attractive locations for investment in Asia.
While Malaysia was embarking on its outward-looking economic policies, there was at the same time, a growing wave of disenchantment with the 'west' and the search for a new template of development. This, the government found, by foisting itself to a 'Look East' approach; not uncoincidentally, East Asian capital grew and began to underscore Malaysia's economic expansion (Machado, 1987; Jomo, 1983). In 1989, growing confidence prompted the Malaysian government to introduce the East Asian Economic Caucus concept which however, never received critical Japanese support and was supplanted by APEC (Nesadurai, 1996; Bodde, 1994: 36-8). Despite an apparent shift towards a more autonomous position, economic ties between Malaysia and the west remains strong and American companies remained the main investors in Malaysia's semiconductor industry (Rasiah, 1995).
While economically imbricated within the interstices of global capital, the Malaysian government was also experiencing a socio-cultural reawakening, prompted by its own search for an alternative model of development. Elsewhere, there was a popular wave of growing Asian consciousness, prompting some writers to talk of the 'Asia/Pacific century' of growth (Rowher, 1995; Berger and Borer, 1997; Naisbitt, 1995) and a growing 'Asian renaissance' (Ibrahim, 1996). This received its fullest explication in the Asian values and human rights debate prevailing in the 1990s. Increasing growing global criticisms of Malaysia and Singapore in 1987, following their detention of social and political activists, prompted both government and intellectual defences of Malaysia's and Singapore's approach to human rights (Mauzy, 1997; Lawson, 1996). In the case of Malaysia, the government, especially via Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, sought to criticize the west for 'incessantly interfering in the domestic affairs of sovereign states', practising 'moral superiority' and adopting a neo-colonial approach to developing countries via its insistence on a rights approach. Mahathir ridiculed the west for its moral laxity, its hypocrisy - its own domestic abuses of human rights e.g. on Afro-Americans in the USA, the Aborigines in Australia and also its inaction on abuses of human rights of Muslims in Bosnia (Wong and Nyland, 1999). Malaysia's critique of the west appeared contradictory and inconsistent with its economic rapport with the west. Whilst often attributed to Mahathir's personal dislike of the 'west', this is a mistaken view and failed to account for Malaysia's growing foreign policy evolution.
In 1997, as Asian economies found themselves under financial siege and as the Malaysian economy faltered, the Malaysian state realized that it no longer singularly controlled the levers of economic change and transformation. Much more significant global forces were at work. The rapid devaluation of the Malaysian ringgit threatened to sweep away the gains of years of successful economic development. Prescriptions rendered were found to be wanting and caused the local and regional economies to haemorrhage more. As the economy sputtered, Mahathir intervened economically. Unfortunately, it also coincided with a political crisis which saw the then deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, sacked and subsequently detained and incarcerated. At the core of this crisis was a generational shift towards politics but critically, there was also an ideological battle over the contours of globalisation.
In the UMNO general assembly of July 1998, supporters of Anwar had called on Dr. Mahathir to root out corruption and increase government transparency (Mallet, 1999; Rosenberger, 1997). These views are not too dissimilar to those articulated and sanctioned by the neo-liberal agenda of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank via their 'good governance' pronouncements (World Bank, 1992; Schmitz, 1995). Mahathir, on the other hand, point to the ravages inflicted on the national economy inflicted by global currency speculators and their supporters (Mohamad, 1997). While this dispute could be simply seen as a mere political struggle between two rivals, at its core is an ideological contest. In pitting the more open, neo-liberal and market-friendly policies of Anwar against his more interventionistic, closed approach, Mahathir in effect rewrote and redefined globalisation, enabling him to exculpate himself as the architect of 'globalising Malaysia' and slating home the responsibility to his opponents who were de facto foreign agents or acting ostensibly for foreign interests. It also allowed Mahathir to attribute blame to foreign external actors for both undermining the national economic well-being and welfare of the country1 while Mahathir assumed the mantle of the 'local hero' braving on in the face of the global 'conspirational' juggernaut.
Calling on Malaysians to be 'suspicious' of and 'beware' globalisation', Mahathir not only bought himself some critical domestic support and space but it also enabled him to develop and define his own view of globalisation. For him, 'unfettered globalisation' was the primary reason for the Asian financial crisis of 1997; more importantly, it provided the ideological bulwark through which the 'west' could control and dominate the world, posing a threat to developing nations2 . Through unchecked market forces, developing countries invariably come under the yoke of neo-liberal dominance and control, resulting in continual underdevelopment and greater global inequality. As he put it, 'The net result of the globalised, deregulated world would be the emergence of huge corporations and banks…Their numbers would not be too big as all the small companies and banks would have been acquired or absorbed in one way or another…Today it is not the exploitation of local labour that is the focus of new capitalists. It is the exploitation of the poor countries worldwide that promises unlimited gains' (Mohamad, 1998a: 111). Elsewhere, he had argued that this state of affairs does not bode well for global democracy: 'The breaking down of borders will result in the powerful truly dominating the weak…A globalised world is not going to be a very democratic world…(It) is going to belong to the powerful dominant countries' (Mohamad, 1996).
For Mahathir, 'globalization' 'means Westernisation and the acceptance of Western business standards and political systems around the world' (Mohamad, 1999: 40). He also asserted that psychologically and culturally, there is a continuity between globalists and past colonialists for 'those who created the economic turmoil that we are facing now are just like the colonialists who once colonized us. Do not think their behaviour has changed' (Mohamd, 1998b: 33). Indeed, he charged that the 'west' did not even need to appear to be friendly. As he put it at a speech to the World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2003, '(the) friendly face of capitalism is not needed any more. They (the west) can do what they like and what they like is to make money for themselves'. He attributed the current parlous state of world affairs to the end of the Cold War, the loss of a countervailing power and the rise of a unipolar world (Mohamad, 2003). As such, for Mahathir, globalisation is not benign but an ever-present threat and needed to critically interrogated and 'interpreted correctly if it is going to bring about a better world' (Mohamad, 1998a: 117). Left alone, these interpretations are reminiscent of the dependistas discourses of the 1970s3 . But Mahathir added a few further twists.
In his contribution, 'Globalization: Challenges and Impact on Asia', Mahathir noted the discursive content of globalization. He noted that globalization in rendering itself as 'deceptively simple' and synonymous with 'new opportunities for wealth creation', has been able to become the global dominant discourse (Mahathir, 2002: 5). Mahathir suggested that a closer and historical reading of globalization would have shown that it is a far more complex phenomenon and that different strategies of engagement should have been put in place. With respect to economic globalization, he noted three clearly discernable phases whereby Asian countries had shown their dexterity and ability to engage with globalism and globality. In the new phase of financial globalization, however, Mahathir argued that global institutions charged with the tasks of policy-making have marginalized national policy-making (and states) and failed to appreciate and be both sensitive and responsive to the global economic historical legacy and context. They have instead been over-zealous in their mission and in doing so, wrought havoc to developing countries and their economies. As such, the current globalization push driven by developed countries and their agents' (companies and financial institutions) self-interest, and managed by global institutions like the WTO and the IMF, are inappropriate, destabilizing and deficient. Accordingly, Mahathir called for both a re-evaluation and action on globalization by Asian countries through joint coordination activities and efforts between themselves and dominant global agents.
These issues were revisited, reiterated and further developed in his retiring speech to the 54 th General Assembly of his party in July 2003. In his speech, Mahathir identified trends and issues which are remarkably close to those sketched out by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt in their recent book, Empire (Negri and Hardt, 2000). For Mahathir, we have (re)entered another phase of (neo)colonialism. This is a process spawned by the rise of a unipolar world, characterized by a borderless world but managed and regulated by a supranational center comprising transnational corporations and advanced capitalist nations led by the remaining superpower, the USA (and its allies). This followed the advent, rise and consolidation of a globalised (and imperial) system which seeks to both manage and discipline the system and its constituent members of nation states through the enforcement of its rules, practices and dicta (ibid: xiv-xv). These forces have displaced and dislocated the majority of the world population and despite their 'democratic claims', 'do not care at all the condemnation of the world against their actions' (Mohamad, 2003b). He went on to argue that the only recourse for Malaysia (and other countries) was to remain ever vigilant, be united (as in national unity), hold steadfast onto their social values and embraced a critical regionalist position as Malaysia sought to negotiate itself through the current phase of globalisation. These prescriptions are not new nor are they radical but are salient building blocks for it suggests that nation-states still retain some autonomy and their actions can help ameliorate the pain of transitions in a globalised economy.
To the uninformed observer, Malaysia's intemperate and vituperative critiques of the west' arose from Malaysia's involvement in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Such a view is clearly erroneous and fails to examine Malaysia's evolving historical engagements with the west. While closely aligned to the 'western alliance' on independence, Malaysia has progressively taken a more open, assertive and independent approach since the early 1970s (Ahmad, 1990; Shafie, 1982; Saravanamuttu, 1987). The crisis, however, enabled Mahathir to show that an independent and autonomous policy and strategy could be crafted that deviate from the prevailing and dominant Washington economic mindset and its strangehold on the global economy (Wade, 1998; Wong et. al. 1999)4 . Mahathir's strident and trenchant criticisms of the 'west', its approach and policies also found very clear distinct targets e.g. his criticisms and depictions of American bail-outs of US firms in 1998 by the US government as double standards and hypocrisy laced with a hidden global agenda5 , when the USA had steadfastly pushed a position of 'market forces and no bail-outs' during the Asian financial crisis.
Perhaps, the more significant and symbolic act was when in July 1998, the government introduced a series of reforms that ran against the orthodoxy - cuts in government expenditure, curtailing credit, increasing interest rates6 - capital controls7 . The policy was seen as a direct challenge to the IMF-led prescriptions of a more market-oriented, open and transparent financial sector. Malaysia, on the other hand, believed that promoting domestic consumption was necessary to help stabilize the domestic economy and that capital controls would curtail the vicissitudes of currency speculation and trading. This prompted howls and derisions from the west, particularly from mainstream western commentators. The Time magazine called it 'Moving in the Wrong Direction' and described the policies as 'isolationism' and a 'disaster' while others saw Mahathir as a serious liability (Roche, 1998)8 . Within Malaysia, these policies received widespread support, lowered inflation, stabilized and even promoted investor confidence and enabled the economy to rebound. In the fall of 1998, both the World Bank and the IMF which had been critical of theses measures (particularly the latter) conceded that the Malaysian plan had worked. Malaysia's credentials of a David slaying the metaphorical economic Goliath were further embellished and established itself as a decisive, resolute, resilient yet unorthodox force prepared to take on the dominant west. Perhaps, because of this and his continuing criticisms of the 'west' and championing the cause of 'developing countries', Malaysia took over the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 2003.
Malaysia, Mahathir claims, is often criticized for its 'barbarism' (since it still allegedly 'hangs' prisoners); cronyistic and corrupt (despite widespread cronyism and corrupt practices in the USA, Australia and many parts of the 'western' world9 ); 'recalcitrant' and irrational (for example its U-turn and 'new' policies on the financial crisis of 1997 and incessant criticisms of the 'west'). Malaysia has responded to these criticisms. It criticized the 'west' for its media excesses, unbalanced reporting, lack of integrity and cultural arrogance, and called for the shedding of colonial blinkers and a restructuring of global economic and political power. These 'frontal assaults' have allowed Malaysia to capitalize on growing anti-western resentment and propelled Malaysia as a champion and a 'voice for the third world' (Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 August 1992; Ahmad, 1990). Malaysia, for example, has championed development causes against environmentalists in the 'third world', supported the minimum wages proposal in the lead up to the formation of the World Trade Organisation, spoken out consistently against labour and social clause-linkages with development and investment policies, argued for the common heritage of Antarctica, criticized the 'west' for its non-involvement in the Bosnian crisis and its double-standards in the Middle-East, including the two recent Gulf Wars, spoken out on human rights and against 'neo-colonial intent' (in Zimbabwe), brokered the establishment of the South Commission and other populist issues, including the excesses of globalisation and hypocrisy over human rights practices and standards (Muzaffar, 1993).
In challenging the representations of his government, Mahathir asks the question of who is representing whom; in staking out its critique, Malaysia was able to mobilize different vectors to (re)construct itself and discourses in global politics. In 'looking East', Malaysia sought to rally its regional allies and neighbours, staking out a 'cultural war' with the 'west' while its South position enabled it to promote itself as a forceful, credible post-colonial nation with strong anti-colonial credentials and bearings. This involves not a mere resentment, critique or rejection of the 'west' but to appropriate and learn critical and useful 'bits' - the 'Western values of orderliness, discipline and firm social organization' (Mohamad, 1986: 44-7) and grafting it onto the local socio-economic milieu to produce a possible and potent hybridised (and local) alternative (Wong, 2001), holding out the potential for resistance and the formulation of an alternative response and modernity (Chatterjee, 1986). This hybridized alternative - a democratic and strong growth market economy, albeit one defined through 'Asian' characteristics - enabled Malaysia to gain significant political latitude.
Staking its claim to success, Malaysia affirmed and offered an alternative which appears to be equally local, economically resilient and successful, dogging and mirroring the 'west'. This mimicry', as Bhabha (1984) has called it, allowed Malaysia to 'enter into the discourses of Europe and the West, to mix with it, transform it, to make it acknowledge marginalized or suppressed or forgotten histories' (Said, 1993: 261). This 'voyage in', as Said has called it, allows Malaysia to champion 'differences', points to historical and current economic and political travesties, and challenge and deconstruct the prevailing globalisation discourse.
Through these strategies, Malaysia hoped and was thus able to show that the scripting of other possible active forms of resistance to a uniform, universal credo is neither automatic nor guaranteed, and indeed may be drawn from 'local' traditions, practices and knowledges. Even in the shadow of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Malaysia was able to legitimize its position through the call of protection of local economic and political rights and sovereignty whilst delegitimising and accusatory of prevailing mainstream economic (and western) orthodoxies. The power and efficacy of the 'west' is thus being turned onto itself and reimplicated in the discourse of power (Wong, 2001: 184-6). In this sense, the 'subaltern' now not only resists but talks back, subverts and destabilizes the dominant hegemonic and prevailing discourses, and (re)claims some space for itself.
Clearly the Mahathirist view of the world is evocative, strong and seductive. It offers its supporters a clear view of the 'enemy' and advice and ideas on dealing with it. In a critical sense, it resembles the 'third worldist' views of Sukarno and Nkrumah (Vaikiotis, 1996: 76-7). In an era of globalisation, while countries are clearly dominated by the exigencies of global markers and global finance, the refusal to be drawn in, subjected to, disciplined and domesticised into the global logic of the (western) empire can act both as an effective and affirmative form of transformative practices. In Malaysia's case, via the use of critical discursive strategies ('mimicry', 'hybridity, representation' and 'orientalism'), it has been able to selectively appropriate 'fragments of modernity' via its embrace and successful prosecution of the free market laced with an Asian 'cultural' flavour enabling it to portray itself as a successful 'Asian' market economy. In so doing, it has allowed Malaysia to transform itself from a relatively 'passive' object (circa the 1960s) into an active subject broaching issues of pan-Islamic practices and thought, global inequalities, human rights, the environment and social, cultural and political representations of 'developing countries' and/or the 'third world'. In inserting, interrupting, interjecting, resisting, returning and reverting the gaze of the dominant system onto itself, Malaysia displays its rhizomatic tendencies10 and shows that it is possible to resist the assault of an almost totalizing global neo-liberal market prescription. As such, the Malaysian/Mahathir project is a critical and ambitious one. Via his denunciations and critiques, Mahathir challenged, shocked and disrupted our complacency but more than that, it showed us it is possible to distil a discourse of interrogation, critique, practice and new cultural and political possibilities. It certainly disabuses us of the view that 'there is no alternative' to neo-liberal market policies and that despite its imbrication within the global system, even small states like Malaysia can maintain and retain their independence and autonomy to ameliorate global excesses and achieve their intended goals.
Despite its putative allure, a closer reading of Mahathir's Malaysia, its position and its relationships with globalisation will reveal not a rejection of globalisation in toto but a rather more selective engaged relationship with globalisation. Its economic agenda remains wedded to an open and globalised economy and yet, it combines a syncretic mix of structuralism, modernization and dependency theories and a dose of neo-colonialist discourses. Intended to reintroduce agency and space back into the closed frameworks and representational categories of a globalising (and somewhat universalizing) trend, Malaysia's strategies have shown us states are still relevant and that we can (re)discover, reaffirm and articulate our own agency, build and develop alternative 'local' practices and resources as we engaged with the contours of global capitalism.
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1. While seemingly critical of 'foreign intervention', during the crisis, Mahathir maintained his eyes on the 'racial arithmetic' in Malaysia. For him, Malay business should not first and foremost be punished. Secondly, in the context of economic and corporate restructuring, Mahathir seemed to prefer the shift of Malay ownership to foreign ownership rather than seeing it passed to Malaysian Chinese control, as evident in the administration's change in foreign ownership policy - increasing it from 49% to 70%. See The Star, 9 June 1998.
2. See, for example, 'Globalisation Makes West Richer, Poor Nations Poorer, Says Dr. M.', Business Times, 25 February 2000. See also Mohamad (2000) where Mahathir repeatedly claimed that the 'western' media regularly and consistently portrayed Malaysia (and the developing world) negatively while globalised financial institutions and traders swept and reaped the world's financial markets for their own gains. Via the former, informal control was exercised to hold in check any critiques of the formal but hidden agenda of the latter domination of the world. This tactic of keeping 'developing countries' 'underdeveloped' had long roots and can be seen in Mohamad (1986b: 48-55).
3. Indeed, as early as 1979, Mahathir had argued that in the world economy, there used to be two co-existing segments, one producing raw materials while the other converted these raw materials into manufactured goods and resold them to the former. The 'law of comparative advantage' however went askew and the former found itself poor and locked in a stage of 'underdevelopment' as they did not have the technology and the skills' to transform themselves (Mahathir, 1979, 1980). Later, he developed his views to incorporate the embrace of new high value-added industries to effectively transform the country from the 'mediocrity of mere assembly operations' to a developed society (Mahathir, 1986a, 1991).
4. Even the conservative pro-Western, pro-government Singapore newspaper, The Straits Times criticized the USA and the IMF for their roles in inflaming the 1997 crisis - see The Straits Times, 15 January 1998; 20 February 1998; 5 June 1998. It is also interesting to note that the chief economist of the World Bank and chairman of Bill Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, Joseph Stiglitz, was continues to be a vocal critic of this Washington view. Indeed, in many of his interventions, he has been supportive of Malaysia's capital controls policy and critical of the unilateralism and 'there-is-no-alternative' neo-classical prescription of the IMF. More recently, he has also articulated these views in Stiglitz (2002).
5. This view is clearly contentious but the IMF's managing director, Michel Camdessus' comments during the crisis in 1998 seemed to provide some support for this position. Camdessus was quoted in The Financial Times, 9 February 1998, as declaring 'What we are doing coincides with the basic purposes of American diplomacy in the world'.
6. This was the package introduced by the then Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim which received critical international support from the IMF. Domestically, the reform package failed and conditions worsened - the economy contracted sharply and unemployment increased, prompting severe economic and financial hardship. The government then, via the newly created National Economic Recovery Council, took a different tack and focused on currency stabilization and continual public expenditure (to both maintain employment and stimulate domestic growth)
7. The Malaysian government pegged the exchange rate and tightened its regulations of the flow of short-term investment and portfolio capital - see Roche, 1998; Nesadurai, 2000: 7; Jomo & Hamilton-Hart ,2001.
8. See also for example the editorials of the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) of 11 and 18 September 1997; Asiaweek, 'The Big Slump, 3 October 1997; and the Economist, "Mahathir's Roasting', 27 September 1997.
9. J. Plender, 'Western Crony Capitalism', Financial Times, 3 October 1998.
10. Gilles Delueze and Felix Guattari (1972) first articulated this concept in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. For them, it was a more realistic depiction of power and its efficacy. Rather than a mere top-down experience, they contended that the system spreads out laterally rather than vertically, propagating itself in a fragmented, discontinuous and multi-directional way. Indeed, contemporary global capitalism and its uneven development resemble this description. Because of this lateral movement, they also argued that resistance took on rhizomatic forms, sprouting all over. More recently, these ideas have been taken up by Negri and Hardt, ibid..
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