Although there has been a considerable amount of work on the effects of economic globalization on Left political party development in the West, very little work has been done that examines such effects on Left parties in post communist Eastern Europe. In this paper, I consider the effects of “globalization” on the process of adaptation of the communist successor parties. I find that with regards to the six parties investigated in this paper, in post communist politics the Left parties appear to adapt differently to the pressures of globalization based in part on the extent to which they are dependent on the political support of organized labor.
Although there has been a growing amount of work on the effects of economic globalization on Left political party development in the West (Clift, 2002; Piazza, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 1998; Kurtzer, 1993; Piven, 1992) very little work has been done that examines such effects on Left parties in post communist Eastern Europe. Most of the literature on the effects of globalization on the political parties of the Left in the West contends that economic globalization has compelled socialist and social democratic parties to distance themselves from their labor bases and to embrace market-oriented policies. To be sure, many Left parties in Eastern Europe (such as in Hungary and Poland) appear to have emulated that pattern. However, another response has been to re-embrace Marxist Leninist fundamentals, along with nationalism, ethnic particularism and economic autarky, or a “red-brown” strategy (such as in Romania and Russia). In this paper, however, I am interested in whether the parties that succeed the formerly dominant communist sought to establish ties with new political constituencies beyond their traditional (and previously officially proclaimed) alliance with the working classes. Indeed, existing theories concerning the effects of economic globalization on the development of Left parties in the West hold that the socialist and social democratic parties have been forced to seek ties with new social groups, largely as a result of the social and economic transformation wrought by economic globalization.
In this paper, I offer some preliminary evidence that examines the effects of the extent to which a country has been exposed to “globalization forces” on the relationship between the communist successor parties and their labor bases. I also consider how this relationship is affected by the extent to which the successor parties are dependent on trade union political support. The evidence provided is only meant to be suggestive, but it highlights how transnational pressures can affect the internal dynamics of party development and identity.
For the purposes of this paper globalization refers to the increasing interdependence of citizens and nations across the world. This interdependence is primarily economic, although it is facilitated by the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system”(McGrew and Lewis, 1994: 23). Globalization, is also a “process by which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe” (McGrew and Lewis, 1995:23). According to Baker, Epstein, and Pollin, globalization is nothing but globalized capitalism that has led to three things: 1) increase in international economic interactions; 2) qualitative changes in the way nation-states operate within any country’s economy; and 3) decrease in power of nation-states and increase in the power of private business and market forces (Baker, Epstein, and Polin, 1998:2). We can therefore define globalization as increasing economic interdependence among the countries of the world in which there is created a multiplicity of linkages, interconnections and interdependence.
Although there are clearly a number of parties that can be classified as ‘Leftist” in post communist politics, I focus my attention on the communist successor parties, or those parties that were formerly the governing party in the communist regime and which inherited the preponderance of the former ruling parties’ resources and personnel (Gryzmala Busse, 2002; Bozoki, 1997; Ishiyama; 1997; 1995). I do so for three reasons. First, unlike ‘new parties,’ the communist successor parties are not merely clubs of notables. They have structure and organization, and are, by any definition, ‘real’ political parties. Second, these parties were particularly susceptible to external pressures to change (including globalization) given their connections to a tainted political past. Third, these parties had a longstanding relationship (albeit more formalistic and official than the Left parties of the West) with organized labor, more so than any other party in post communist politics.
Further, these six parties were selected because they represent the three basic types of communist successor parties as identified by John Ishiyama:(1) those in which the “radical” reformist element took control prior to the transition (Hungarian Socialist Party and the Polish Democratic Left Alliance); (2) those in which the “liberals” and moderate reformers maintained control of the party (the Party of Social Democracy of Romania) and (3) those in which the “stand patters” remained a significant part of the party’s leadership (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Communist Party of Ukraine) (Ishiyama, 1995). In addition, these six parties were selected because their party programs were fairly easily accessible (unlike for instance the Party of Communists of Moldova, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, or the United List of Social Democrats in Slovenia) and they were electorally competitive (unlike the Latvian Socialist Party or the Estonian Socialist Labour Party) in relatively open and competitive elections (unlike in Belarus, Serbia until very recently, and the Caucasian and Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union)
The effects of globalization on domestic politics generally (and on the parties of the Left in particular) has become quite a popular topic over the past decade. Indeed, there are those who contend that globalization undermines domestic actors because it leads to the opportunity for the owners of mobile capital to relocate abroad and increases competition for domestic producers in the face of competition from foreign producers. As Lowell Turner argues the more dynamic, competitive and interdependent global markets undermine older forms of production, particularly by promoting a movement towards smaller production units (Turner, 1991). As a result, the accompanying move to decentralized capital-intensive production has led to less labor solidarity and declining strength of organized labor, which in turn has weakened the parties of the Left.
These external pressures have caused the Left parties to forge new political identities for themselves (Kurtzer, 1993). The social democratic and socialist parties in the west have become increasingly conservative in economic issue areas such as the regulation of workplace practices, redistributive taxation, and expansion or maintenance of the welfare state (Piazza, 2001). Moreover, as Herbert Kitschelt contends, the changes that occurred in the 1970’s and 1980’s in the social, economic, and cultural structures of the advanced capitalist countries demanded that the social democratic parties alter their political appeals to attract new constituencies and remain electorally viable (Kitschelt, 1994; Taylor, 1993). However, different Left parties adapted differently, largely based on their internal organizational features. Parties that had relatively loose internal features (such as loosened ties with organized labor, less internal discipline etc) were better able to adapt to changed circumstances than were more “entrenched” parties, especially those with strong ties to the labor unions. These latter parties, because of internal constraints on their maneuverability, had relatively greater difficulty responding to change and lost ground in the elections.
On the other hand, some argue that globalization has not really impacted on Left parties, and may have even served to enhance their position. In fact, Peter Katzenstein contends that open trade-dependent economies are more likely to produce greater union effectiveness as the result of corporatist arrangements made among the state labor and capital (Katzenstein, 1995). As a result the domestic insecurities that result from fears of globalization heightens the role of political actors that appear to be a bulwark against such insecurities - i.e. the parties of the Left. This would thus cause parties to try to present themselves as bulwarks against the insidious forces of globalization, hardening their position as opposed to appealing to new constituencies. Thus, globalization can also theoretically cause the consolidation of a socialist anti-global identity for the successor parties who oppose accommodating with “outsider” political forces.
There is an increasing amount of literature that focuses on globalization and post communist Eastern Europe, although this literature has concentrated largely on general effects rather than on how globalization affects political party development per se. Jacques Rupnik, for instance, contends that “in no other region of the world has the impact of international factors on democratization been as apparent as in Central and Eastern Europe” (Rupnik, 2000:57). Paul Kubicek argues that the greater role of trade, foreign investment, and foreign ownership, has had negative effects on organized labor and their political allies on the Left (Kubicek, 1999). The new trade and investment climate in post communist states benefit lower labor costs and gives an incentive for government export-oriented enterprises and foreign investors to weaken unions. Foreign companies have actively sought to undermine the power of unions, and multinational corporations have forced governments to accede to their demands (including overlooking breaches of the law) (Kubicek, 1999:95-96).
For others, globalization has unleashed negative forces in the region, such as the resurfacing of primordial cultural identities and culturally based conflicts. As Carl-Ulrick Schierup notes, the economic penetration of post communist Eastern Europe and the cultural challenges of westernization have caused many to “turn to the past in a seemingly conservative cultivation of exclusive ethnic identities and discriminatory myths of cultural origin” (Schierup, 1995:155). Nikolai Genov, as well, sees accompanying globalization in post communist Eastern Europe a set of socio-cultural values that have begun to penetrate and transform Eastern European societies (Genov, 2000). These trends have effectively transformed the political space in Eastern Europe, giving rise to a whole host of different societal reactions, in particular greater emphases on ethnic and national particularism as defense mechanisms against the cultural penetration of western values.
On the other hand, Roderick Martin contends that globalization’s impact on Central and Eastern Europe has been minimal and argues that “globalization theories have only limited relevance for understanding current development in Central and Eastern Europe. This is because of Western capital’s tentative approach to the region, and preference for low commitment strategies– although the tentativeness varies between countries”(Roderick, 1998:8). Further, unlike Kubicek, who sees greater collusion between post communist governments and foreign capital and multinationals, Martin contends that relations between the incoming multinationals and national governments in Eastern Europe have “often been problematic” (Martin, 1998: 8)
Thus, there is a considerable debate as to the extent to which globalization has actually affected politics in post communist Eastern Europe. On the one hand, if scholars like Kubicek and Rupnik are correct, there should be a systematic relationship between the degree to which countries are globalized and how the communist successor parties have sought to appeal to other constituencies. On the other hand if Martin and Kitschelt are more correct, then “internal” factors (that is internal to the party) are more likely to account for the variation observed when comparing the political appeals of the successor parties.
Thus far, most of the literature on the communist successor parties has focused on why these parties made a political comeback in the 1990’s rather than on examining how they have reacted to globalization (Orenstein, 1998; Ishiyama, 1997). Even among those few works that have examined how these parties have reacted to changed political circumstances, none have examined how they have reacted to economic globalization in the region (Ishiyama and Shafqat, 2000; Oates, 1998; Agh, 1997).
To examine how globalization has affected the successor parties’ relationship with their traditional constituencies, it is first necessary to identify the different ways in which the parties have tailored their political appeals in the 1990’s. For the purposes of this paper, I am particularly interested in the issue of with whom the party presents an image of “solidarity” or to whom the successor party directs its appeals. Although there are many concepts of solidarity, one of the most common is “interest-based solidarity” or a feeling of reciprocal loyalty between persons that feel that they are alike and have a common interest in staying together. This involves individuals asserting ties that bind them together, and that these ties are distinct from interests outside of the community.
In this paper, I use political party programs to illustrate the parties’ political appeals. Political parties, like other speakers and persuaders, differentiate their way of talking and writing according to contexts and audiences, and hence use different styles of political language. Political party programs are created to communicate a message from one sender, the party, to a receiver, the voter. Such documents are negotiated texts, that most often scrutinized by leaders and members to assure that the texts should contain the “correct” language and symbols. They are often compromises between those who wish to convince and influence the electorate (often though adjustments to anticipated reactions from voters) and the need to reassure party activists about adherence to party traditions.
In this paper I am particularly interested in how traditional “insider” and “outsider” groups are viewed by the communist successor parties in their programs. Traditional groups include labor, peasants and the intelligentsia (or the groups long proclaimed in Marxist Leninist theory as the bulwarks of the vanguard party); an example of a traditional “outside” group is the bourgeoisie . The more the party emphasizes traditional insider groups and/or vilifies outsider groups, the more it emphasizes a rhetorical strategy that aims at a community of “interests” rather than accommodating to outside structures.
To measure the orientation of the party to groups this paper employed the technique of ‘theme coding’ using sentences and ‘quasi-sentences’ as the unit of analysis (Janda, Harmel, Edens and Goff, 1995; Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987). In this procedure, sentences were coded “since they form the natural grammatical unit in most languages” (Budge et. al 1987: 24). Like Budge, et al (1987) sentences were counted rather than single words or phrases to measure the “stress laid on certain ideas and concerns” rather than emphasizing slogans. However, very long sentences were composed into ‘quasi-sentences’ where the sense changed between colons or commas.
The sentences were coded in terms of themes, corresponding to themes related to the different kinds of “solidarity” mentioned above. Interest based solidarity (where the party emphasizes groups traditionally associated with insider groups) is measured by two dimensions. First, there is the extent to which these program express solidarity with traditional groups associated with Marxist Leninist parties is measured, such as “workers” “the labor class” “peasants” “proletariat” and the “intelligentsia.” This represents the solidarity with traditional values and supporters of socialism. Second, I coded each theme in terms of whether out groups (such as “bourgeoisie” “capitalists” “entrepreneurs” and “businessmen”) are viewed positively or negatively. The more the party program emphasizes in groups and and/or vilifies out groups, the more the party follows a traditional exclusivist strategy. On the other hand, the less negative the parties view out groups, the more willing the party is to accommodate with those formerly “alien” groups.
To measure the extent to which the parties have reached out beyond the confines of traditional insider groups I employ a technique derived from previous work on post-Soviet Russian parties (Oates, 1998). Based upon the work of Budge et al, Sarah Oates identified key terms which comprised what she referred to as “anti-market and pro-market” indices. The first involved identification of terms associated with “anti-market” themes, specifically mentions of a controlled economy, nationalization, pro-Marx (or Marxism), pro Lenin (or Leninism). The pro-market index involved mentions of markets/capitalism, enterprise, incentives, and anti-Marx and anti-Lenin were used. The index was completed by subtracting the anti-market scores from the pro-market scores.
I employ an adaptation of these measures to take into account political orientation -- especially how much the parties emphasize solidarity with the groups and structures traditionally associated with the Marxist Leninist Party. However, for my purposes, rather than use Oates’ terminology (pro-market versus anti-market which focuses exclusively on economic issues) I create an index that measures the extent to which the party is willing to accommodate with other groups. This index is illustrated by the following formula:
Accommodation Score = (negative mentions of in groups + positive mentions of out groups)/ (positive mentions of in groups + negative mentions of out groups)
To form a composite score for each party the number of negative mentions of in groups and terms positive on out groups is divided by the number of terms in favor of traditional groups and negative on outgroups. A higher score represented a party which had relatively more negative mentions of in groups and more positive mentions of out groups, and a lower score represented a program which had relatively more positive mentions of in groups and negative mentions of out groups. This ratio is used to measure the extent to which the successor parties have sought out to extend their appeals beyond their traditional socio-political constituencies.
The party programs included the programs of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR, 1997), the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP 1998), the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP renamed in 1998 as the Democratic Left Alliance-SLD), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM 1999), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF 1997), and the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU 1998). In each of the cases the programs were from the most recent party congresses (at the time of this research).1
As far as the “independent” variables are concerned, the extent to which a country was exposed to globalization was measured using a variation of the measure developed in 2001 by the international consulting firm, A.T. Kearney, which reported the extent of “globalization” for fifty countries with “advanced economies” across the world based on data from 1995 through 1998. Recently, the same firm revised its measures and updated its study with data for 1999 and 2000 while extending it to 62 nations (AT Kearney, 2002). Basically, the measure they created was based on a multiplicity of different dimensions that characterized globalization. These included:
1. Economic integration: trade, foreign direct investment and portfolio capital flows, and income from nonresident employees and from foreign assets;
2. Personal contacts: international travel and tourism, international telephone calls, and cross-border transfers;
3. Technology: number of internet users, internet hosts, and secure servers;
4. Political engagement (added in 2001): number of memberships in international organizations, participation in U.S. Security Council missions, and foreign embassies
This ambitious attempt to measure globalization in single composite index may not be a perfect measure of the degree to which countries are “globalized” but it represents the first real attempt to capture the multidimensional aspects of the concept. For most variables in the index the measures are standardized by the country’s nominal economic output or its population. The “data panels” were then “normalized” via a process where the values of the single lowest data point were set to zero and the highest at “1” with all others falling in between. The individual country scores were then summed across the data panels, with double weighting for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and portfolio capital flows, as were the composite internet measure and international telephone traffic. This reflected their importance in transmitting ideas and information across borders. Globalization index scores for each county and each year were calculated by summing the scores across the data panels.
The second key variable cited in the literature that theoretically mitigates the effects of globalization on Left parties, and in turn affects whether the Left parties seek to expand their appeal beyond a working class base, is the extent to which the parties are dependent upon union support. To measure the extent to which parties are dependent on union support, I use the proportion of those who identified themselves as supporters of the successor parties who also identified themselves as union members, as reported in the World Values Survey (1995-97 wave). I employ this measure rather than the commonly used measure of the proportion of the non agricultural labor force unionized because the latter measure does not measure the extent to which the party relies on union support for its electoral support. On the other hand, the World Values Survey data does provide a rough indicator as to the degree to which the successor party is dependent on union members for electoral support. To measure this, I take the total number of respondents on the world values survey who indicated they would support the communist successor party and indicated they were members of a trade union and divide that into the total number of supporters of the communist successor party.
The measures for accommodation, globalization and dependence on union support were then recoded into “relatively high” and “relatively low” categories. For accommodation, relatively high scores were .50 and higher, and relatively low scores less than .50. Globalization was measured using the data from the A.T. Kearney index. Based upon these data, the countries in the index were rank ordered from “most globalized” to least from the 2001 scores (that covered data from 1995-98). For the purposes of this paper, the six countries in this study were divided into two groups, relatively higher globalized countries (meaning ranked in 31st place on the AT Kearney list and above) and those that were relatively less globalized (meaning ranked from 32nd place and lower). For the dependence on union support the cutoff used was .30 which indicated that at least 30% of the electoral support for a successor party came from union members.
Table 1 illustrates two sets of expectations, those that are anticipated by the existing theoretical literature, and two other “inconsistent” patterns. In the first pattern, where the level of globalization is relatively low and the degree to which the successor parties depend on electoral support from union members is relatively high, it is expected that the party will seek to accommodate with groups with which it has not been traditionally associated. This is because there is little pressure exerted by globalization that fundamentally changes production and transforms the social classes that comprise the traditional sources of political support for the successor parties. In addition, because the party is dependent on union support, there is a significant check placed on the party on altering its identity and moving away from exclusively identifying with the working classes.
In the second pattern, the situation is reversed. High globalization and relatively low dependence on union support leads to more external pressure for accommodation, and fewer internal checks on the party to alter its identity. Thus, I expect that tendency for successor parties faced with this situation is to exhibit relatively high levels of accommodation.
On the other hand, there are the “inconsistent patterns”, inconsistent in the sense that they run counter to the expectations derived from theory. The most important inconsistent pattern is when high globalization meets high unionization. Thus the external and internal pressures run at cross purposes, and hence this situation allows us to ascertain which of these “pressures” is relatively more important in affecting whether a party accommodates or not.
Table 2 summarizes the theme codes from the six parties. Table 3 illustrates how the six cases fit the patterns specified in Table 1. The PDSR, KPRF and the KPU correspond to the first pattern (low globalization, high dependence on union support– Romania with the union support score at 40.7; for Russia the union support score was 40.0; and for Ukraine the union support score was 33.3) and are consistent with the expected outcome of relatively low accommodation (.42, .10 and .07 respectively).
There are three parties that correspond to the inconsistent patterns. The SLD (Poland) is faced with relatively low degrees of globalization (at 4.0 and 6.5, respectively) and do not heavily depend on union support for their electoral support (at 10.0) and exhibit relatively high levels of accommodation (at .73). On the other hand, the MSZP (Hungary) and the KSCM (Czech Republic) are faced with relatively high degrees of globalization (10.5 and 13.0 respectively) and are relatively dependent on union support (52.5 and 36.3 respectively) but exhibit different levels of accommodation. The MSZP has an accommodation score which is relatively high (.86) while the KSCM has a relatively low accommodation score (.30).
Despite the Hungarian case, the above results suggest that what is important in promoting accommodation is the relatively low degree of dependence on union support regardless of the level of globalization. Indeed, four of the five cases that had relatively high levels of dependence on union electoral support (PDSR, KPRF, KPU, KSCM) also exhibited relatively low levels of accommodation despite different levels of globalization. The one exception is the case of the MSZP, which, despite relatively high levels of dependence on union electoral support, also had relatively high levels of accommodation. This may be due, as many have pointed out (see Agh, 1995; 1997) to Hungarian exceptionalism, and the great influence of trans European socialism (via the socialist international) on the MSZP.2
The effects of economic globalization on the development of political parties in post communist politics remains unclear. Indeed, the above results suggest that the internal features of the communist successor parties (particularly the relationship between the party and organized labor) play a more important role in affecting whether these parties seek to establish ties with new constituencies, much more so than merely the pressures generated by globalization. The above result is consistent with Kitschelt’s (1994) observation concerning western socialist and social democratic parties that internal characteristics are key in explaining how parties react to the pressures generated by economic globalization. In post communist politics as well, the Left parties appear to adapt differently to the pressures of globalization based largely on the extent to which they are dependent on the political support of trade unions. Parties that were less dependent on the political support of organized labor were more likely to adapt and seek out new constituencies than were “entrenched” parties. These latter parties, in part because of internal constraints on their maneuverability, have had relatively greater difficulty responding to change and have been less likely to seek out new constituencies (at least in terms of programmatic appeals).
However, this may change over time. Indeed, the above conclusions were only based upon a simple cross sectional analysis of six successor parties. The social and political transformation wrought by economic globalization has really not yet occurred in the post communist countries. When that transformation comes, this will alter the relationship between labor and the communist successor parties. Indeed, it is likely that further penetration of global capital in the region will specifically alter the relationship between labor and the communist successor parties, compelling many of these parties (and even the most “hardline” as the KPRF and the KPU) to seek out new political constituencies. However, the search for new constituencies is not without risks: Witness for example the demise of the Slovak Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), which was in part due to the accommodative tactics of the leadership. Indeed this party accommodated so much with Centrist political parties (and for a time the nationalist former Prime Minister Meciar) that this left openings for a disgruntled wing of the party to opt for the xenophobic rhetoric of Robert Fico or defect to a resurgent Slovak Communist Party (KSS) in the election of 2002. Thus, there are limits to which the successor parties can accommodate, and these limits are likely to be imposed by the internal constituencies of these parties.
Notes
1.The PDSR, KSCM, BSP, SdRP, LDDP programs were from official translations made into English. The author had the MSZP and SDSM programs translated and the KPRF and KPU were translated by the author. All programs were then coded by the author and one other coder. The intercoder reliability coefficient stood at .92 on average for all programs. When there was some disagreement between the coders, the author acted as the final judge.
2. For this argument see especially Pridham (2001).
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