Globalization (2008)

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ELITE INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES: THE IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND MEXICO

Matthew Todd Bradley, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Indiana University Kokomo
E-mail: mtbradle@iuk.edu

Halia Mayela Valladares Montemayor
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of International Relations
Universidad Autonoma de Tamaulipas
Victoria, Tamaulipas, Mexico
E-mail: amvalladares@uat.edu.mx


Abstract

Newly independent nation-states grapple with governance, in the midst of globalization and “democratic waves.” The post-colonial political mavericks can manipulate the institutions in the fragile states to the extent that the choices may be antithetical to democratic consolidation. Thus, institutional choices will be one of the factors which will determine democratic maturation. This paper seeks to examine any patterns of institutional choices by political elites in Africa, the Middle East, and Mexico coupled with the realities of globalization. Secondly, this paper will illustrate which institutional choices are more feasible for democratic consolidation in fragile states.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the push for democratization and globalization have been touted as the two-pronged “savior” of fledgling governments throughout the “Third World” or “developing” world. However, the majority of studies on democratization and globalization often ignore, or at best give scant attention to Africa, the Middle East and Mexico. Democracy coupled with economic liberalization in the name of globalization has been viewed as the panacea for the world’s struggling and nascent countries. These nascent states, many of which are newly independent countries (NICs) as well, are “playing” catch up in many instances with the dominant well-established Western countries. Coupled with the realities of abject poverty, ethnic and religious prone-politics, and class a cleavage in many of these (NICs) is the experimentation of state-centric versus anti-state-centric institutional policies. Basically, state-centric institutional polices advance the idea that governmental intervention (or regulatory measures) in the political and economic realms will help lessen the chances for turmoil. Whereas, anti-state-centric policies advocate minimal governmental intervention, the “invisible hand” of the market notion should suffice any major political and economic deprivation.

Contrary to the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992) thesis, Western forms of democracy are not necessarily appropriate for these politically fragile and economically weak states for a variety of reasons (which will be highlighted later in this article). A politically fragile state is a situation in which state authority has not been effectively established or consolidated (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Moreover, the state institutions are weak, and the state has very little direct control over either the citizens or resources under their authority. A quintessential example of a politically fragile state currently would be Iraq. By economically weak I refer to David Simon’s (2003, p. 140) definition, nation-states that are “dependent on a narrow range of exports, especially of raw and semi-processed commodities and perhaps one or two groups of manufactures, are more vulnerable and have already seen domestic industry undermined by cheaper imports.” For example, during the decade of the 1990s, the average level of subsidies and other transfers of income as a percentage of expenditures in lower middle income countries were only 18% in 1990 and 26% in 1997 (compared to highly industrialized countries where the average level of subsidies and other income transfers was approximately 60%) (worldbank.org), an example of an economically weak state would be current day Ethiopia.

Thus, this paper seeks to investigate the general patterns and implications of institutional choices on democracy in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico in the face of the growing demands of economic glasnost and perestroika, i.e., globalization. A caveat, the generic geographical, political term “Middle East” is a colonial and Western imperial, Eurocentric construct, a byproduct of an unfavorable and inferior other, like the Orient connotation of Asia (Said 1978). Moreover, the Middle East as we know it signifies the area once known as the Near East by the European colonializers, i.e., Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan (Bill and Springbord 1990). Although countries in the Middle East have no common cultural, linguistic, religious, or socio-political identities (Alkadry 2002) they do however, exhibit general patterns of institutional choices by their political leaders just like in Africa. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, to minimize confusion and debate, the Middle East will be used to convey the general geographical areas between the Mediterranean Sea, and the geographical areas west of Asia, and including the Gulf States and the countries of North Africa (Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco). Additionally, the only two ethnic groups in the above areas which do not currently have a nation-state (homeland), the Palestinians and Kurds are also included in the Middle East.

The organization of this paper is as follows. First (after the introduction), we will briefly discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the literature on democracy generally and as it applies to Africa, the Middle East and Mexico; secondly, we will address feasible institutional choices; thirdly, we will examine some baseline data and discuss the findings; lastly, we will discuss the conclusions and implications for future research in the area of institutional choice, globalization, and democracy in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The end of the anxious Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union and the satellite countries (“puppet” governments) in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico, has ushered in vociferous calls for globalization and democratization (Grugel 2002). Even though in the last fifty plus years of Middle East independence, not a single country in the Middle East has achieved full-fledged democracy (Alkadry 2002) at least not according to Western, liberal standards of democracy (with perhaps Turkey being the exception). However, diverse Middle Eastern and African countries such as Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Iran, Morocco, Sudan, have made considerable strides toward constructing democratic institutions (Alkadry 2002). But, most Middle Eastern countries have only attained the level of procedural democracy (Ali 2002). There are elections for legislative and executive seats in Algeria, Lebanon, Iran, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, and Yemen (The Middle East and North Africa 2001). On the other hand, in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia there are elections for legislative seats. However, currently none of the oil-rich Gulf States (the oil monarchies), with the exception of Kuwait, have electoral participation, they include Saudi Arabia (coincidently a United States ally), Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman (The Middle East and North Africa 2001). But, generally the democratization literature has struggled to explain political change such as liberalization in the Middle East and Africa, especially North Africa (Anderson 1995).

Unfortunately, much of the democratization literature focuses on “substantive policy content” (Powell 2004, p. 13) which limits our ability to analyze and compare across countries. Instead, Powell suggests that students of democratization should focus on the processes of democratic linkages, like structuring choices (first linkage), institutional aggregation (linkage two), and policymaking (final linkage). Regrettably, Western paradigms of democracy, suggest that any discussion outside of particular endogenous variables, are presumed to stymie political liberalization efforts. Additionally, liberalization efforts do not always open up the political process or help democratize. At times, liberalization efforts such as the essential tool, elections, have helped sustain authoritarian governments in sub-Saharan Africa by furnishing a tactical maneuver that kept the competitors at bay without acquiescing the government’s authority (Joseph 1997). Moreover, Western, liberal democracies that tout “winner-take-all” or zero-sum games in majoritarian systems perhaps are not appropriate in highly stratified societies like in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico. Grand coalitions which typically appease majority and minority groups are perhaps more advantageous for Africa, the Middle East and Mexico. Furthermore, in majoritarian systems, the majority party governs with fewer constraints, not only regarding political choices but also fiscal policy choices (Persson and Tabellini 2003). This reality has colossal implications in the face of globalization’s “push and pulls” factors. “Push and pull” factors include notions of free trade and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in order to compete in the global marketplace. Moreover, Dillman (2002) has demonstrated that in the case of North Africa, significant globalization measures in the form of economic trade and liberalization policies have had very little impact on political liberalization. Dillman (2002) attributes this shortcoming to political elites’ institutional choices which stipulate partial economic reforms that only sustain distributional coalitions, and which limit far-reaching political reforms to the masses. In other words, the autonomous preferences and interests of political elites override the public good of increased political liberties and civil rights for the community.

Likewise in most of the democratization literature, “suspects” such as primordial political culture, religion, ethnicity and class cleavages, low levels of economic development, low levels of education, and fragile or nonexistent civil society activities are considered quintessentially destructive forces to any democratic model. There is clearly a relationship between highly fractionalized (ethnic, class and religious cleavages) countries and the tendency to be associated with lower levels of constraints on their chief political executive (e.g., president, prime minister) (Aghion, et al. 2004). Thus, lower levels of executive constraints open the door to corruption and autocratic rule, which clearly are antithetical to democracy-building. Furthermore, ethnically fragmented societies’ political systems are less democratic (Aghion, et al. 2004). In such ethnically diverse societies, executives choose political systems and make institutional choices which shield or insulate certain groups and prevent others (out-groups) from having input.

In addition, there is other evidence illustrating that religious and ethnic cleavages have compromised democratic consolidation (Yegen 1999; Lewin and Stier 2002), not only in the Middle East, but throughout Africa as well. Notwithstanding, the “third wave” (Huntington 1991) of democracy appears to be gaining if not hurricane strength, at least “tropical depression” fortitude in previously unthinkable places throughout Africa, the Middle East and Mexico. African countries such as Botswana (the longest standing democracy in post-colonial Africa), Mauritius, Mauritania, South Africa, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and others have made the arduous trek to democracy and have consolidated democracy at various levels. Currently, 35% of Africa can be characterized as democratic, i.e., nineteen of the fifty-four countries have democratic rule. This ratio should not be considered shabby by pessimists, given the reality that most of Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa has only been “free” from colonial rule less than fifty years. Never mind the reality that democracy waxes and wanes and “one size does not fit all.” Rustow’s (1970, p. 346) parsimonious recommendation is quite appropriate even in this post-Cold War era, “there may be many roads to democracy.” Or put another way, “... the same formal rules and/or constitutions imposed on different societies produce different outcomes” (North 1990, p. 4).

LITERATURE REVIEW- DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO

Democratization in Mexico has been a long, complex and exhausting process (Ruiz Mondragon, 2006). According to several sources, the Mexican democratization process finished in the year 2000 with the presidential election, when, after seventy years of one ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), political change happened with the election of a president from an opposition party called the National Action Party (PAN) (Pacheco Mendez, 2003; Castellanos Hernandez, 2004).

The claim for a democratic country was observed for the first time in Mexico in 1968, when a massive group of university students protested, claiming democratic freedom among other issues (Becerra et al, 2000). The democratic transition strengthened in the 1970s, but real political change started in the late 1980s. It was in 1988, when the opposition started to win some elections on the local level, a presidential candidate from the opposition lost by only a small margin. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its first state election in 1989, becoming a predominant party and not a hegemonic one (Galeana, 1998; Schmidt, 1993; Becerra, 2000; Valades and Gutierrez, 2001; Loaeza, 2001; Martinez Valdes, 2005).

In the early 1990s, Mexican citizens became very frustrated with the government and a group of citizens formed a group called the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in an attempt to start a revolution. They did not succeed but they caught the attention of international activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and contributed to the transition to democracy (Martinez Valdes, 2005). In 1997 the Institutional Revolutionary Party lost a couple of seats in Congress and some states (Becerra, 2000; Covian Andrade, 2004; Aboites Aguilar, 2004). That year the primary change in the political landscape was that the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), a minority opposition party at the moment, won the election for Head of Government of the Federal District, a role lying somewhere between Mexico City’s major and state governorship, a newly created post (Becerra, 2000; Loaeza, 2001).

In 2000, 60% of Mexicans were ruled by elected representatives from opposition parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party that used to be hegemonic, became a minority opposition party according to Ojeda Gomez (2005). In 2000 Mexico also obtained political pluralism, but not a full democracy. A full democracy is only obtained by alternating the ruling party in the presidency (Ojeda Gomez, 2005). In the 2006 presidential elections, the National Action Party (PAN) that ruled the past six years won reelection, so alternation was not attained, the country has to wait another six years and struggle in the process to obtain a full democratic government according to the definition of a full democracy. It is important to emphasize that until 1990 electoral fraud was a given; presently the credibility of the electoral process has improved as a result of the creation of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) which considers the participation of regular citizens in the electoral process. However, the legality of the elections is still questioned and subject to corruption, for example in the 2006 presidential election, the second largest party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution, questioned the results and formed its own government.

The Institutional Revolutionary Party maintained one-party rule and control of the political system in Mexico since the party’s founding in 1929 (Loaeza, 2001; Marshall and Jaggers, 2003). As mentioned before, the Institutional Revolutionary Party won every single presidential election until 2000, and won almost every state, city and chamber election for roughly seven decades. Therefore, the electoral campaign of 2000 was characterized for being a combat of all opposition parties against the Institutional Revolutionary Party, with the aim of defeating this party (Valades and Gutierrez, 2001).

Democratic elections are only one part of the democratization process, there were other reforms needed such as policymaking. It was in the 1990s when Mexican congressmen decided that there had to be proportional representation from all parties in the Congress and in local government (Galeana, 1998). Still, the Congress is not at its optimal stage, there are reforms needed to be able to operate in a genuine democracy (Galeana, 1998). Before the transition to a democracy, the Mexican political system was characterized as being a soft authoritarian government; it was distinguished by maintaining political domination through a single hegemonic party, without using military force, by manipulation and corruption of the electoral process (Valades, 2001; Pacheco Mendez, 2003). Authoritarianism was considered an integral part of the Mexican culture, because it is associated with paternalism which is still a cultural characteristic of Mexico. It is important to take into consideration that in its beginnings the Mexican authoritarian government incited economic development and political stability; as an example it established mandatory education for all citizens, agrarian distribution, the nationalization of the petroleum industry, and the trade alliance between Mexico and North America, i.e., the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

However the main setback of this government is that it has the power to author legislation without consent of those being governed. In Mexico during the one ruling party period, the president had supreme power; he had the absolute majority in both chambers, emphasizing the highly centralized political power or authoritarian system that existed in Mexico (Schmidt, 1993; Galeana, 1998; Ojeda Gomez, 2005). In addition the president had the power of electing his successor –still there were elections- and electing or removing state governors and other political positions; he was the chief of the country, the chief of his party, the chief of the military, the chief of congress and of the judicial power (Castellanos Hernandez, 2004; Martinez Valdes, 2005). The Institutional Revolutionary Party ruled as a majoritarian system, governing with few constraints, if any.

The general perception is that Mexico is still under an authoritarian government, without democracy. The Mexican political system is still an environment full of mistrust, corruption, filled with inefficient politicians that are insensitive to social concerns, and where the political parties are oligarchies that seek to preserve their privileges (Covian Andrade, 2001; Covian Andrade 2004; Molina, 2005; Ojeda Gomez, 2005; Ruiz Mondragón, 2006; Rivera Rodriguez, 2007). It is well known, that political alliances are used to strengthen power positions (Schmidt, 1993).

There are democratic elections and this is where the democracy starts and ends in Mexico. The new ruling parties need to prove that winning the elections was just the beginning, not the end of the race (Galeana, 1998). Furthermore, it is not possible to consolidate a democracy in Mexico only by changing the institutions or ruling parties; a real cultural change is required (Molina, 2005). The consolidation of the democratic process is still far from becoming a pluralist government (Valades and Gutierrez, 2001). According to Covian Andrade (2004) the change of power in Mexico did not change the political system. According to Meyer (Ruiz Mondragón, 2006) Mexico has a weak civil society, and democracies flourish better where there is strong involvement in the form of associations (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) and viable institutions.

INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES

What are institutions? In the case of political institutions, they are public entities “with formally designated structures and functions, intended to regulate certain defined activities which apply to the whole population” (Bealey 1999, p. 166). Furthermore, “institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals” (North 1990, p. 4). Institutions help constrain those innate human impulses. Institutions are especially important in the immediate post-colonial period, because of the trepidation of the residuals of colonialization, the “jockeying” for power by the elites and mobilization of competing interests. Political elite behavior (and all political behavior for that matter), including corrupt behavior (manipulating public power for one’s private gain) is by and large influenced by the way political power is organized. The key to constraining corruption is to provide some level of checks and balances on the passions of human nature. Institutionalism focuses on regulating the political behavior of the political leaders. Thus, institutionalism is the theory that posits formal political organizations like legislatures and courts are necessary to ameliorate political behavior that attempts to engage in corruption. Organizations may facilitate democratic rule, but are not sufficient to create democratic consolidation. Organizations are endogenous “tools” that compete with exogenous “push and pull” factors such as globalization. Political elites in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico in their attempts to wean themselves from the residuals of colonialism, autocratic and military rule should consider the types of institutional choices that are appropriate for their particular country. Political elite choices include, constraining executive power in the form of legislative checks and balances; expanding executive recruitment efforts that go beyond nepotism; expanding who can participate in the political process (e.g., not just males over the age of eighteen, or royal blood lines); and increasing the competitiveness of participation, all of which can be mandated and monitored via a written constitution.

Institutions are tools to help sustain democracy. Moreover, “institutions structure behavior into stable, predictable, and recurrent patterns,” thus “institutional systems are less volatile and more enduring, and so are institutionalized democracies” (Diamond, et al. 1995, p. 33). This notion of institutions is a type of theory of organizational institutionalism. It suggests that there are necessary organizations such as legislatures, executives and courts that can facilitate democratic transitions and ultimately the institutionalization of democracy, that is, democratic consolidation. However, we still should heed Rustow’s (1970) “pre-third wave” finding, in which he illustrated that transitions to democracy are dynamic and thus varied. Rustow warns us that “no two existing democracies have gone through a struggle between the very same forces over the same issues and with the same institutional outcome. Hence, it seems unlikely that any future democracy will follow in the precise footsteps of any of its predecessors” (p. 354).

Colonial polices in terms of economic growth and democratic consolidation did not vary much in either Africa or the Middle East. And maintenance of hand-picked political elites as pawns of the Western colonializers helped perpetuate policy-implementing institutions (an executive branch), as opposed to policymaking institutions (legislatures). In other words, African and Middle Eastern colonial and post-colonial leaders were “forced” to be administrators of Western propagated policies as “tools” of Western imperialism, as opposed to creating viable participatory, representative legislatures. Legislatures would be more beholden to their constituents, which would allow for some democratic maturation. As Riggs (1963) and LaPalombara (1974) illustrated years ago (the residuals of which are still quite conspicuous), the lack of effective legislatures, cumbersome bureaucracies, and entrenched military rule is still commonplace throughout much of Africa, the Middle East and Mexico. Likewise, the nineteenth century European colonializers carved up Africa and the Middle East, establishing non-democratic and traditionally alien governments in the nascent states. Thus, general patterns of institutional choice by post-colonial leaders tended to reflect their colonial legacies of either liberal or statist political and economic policies. In the twenty-first century, Taylor and Nel (2002), caution the “New Africa” Initiative (comprising the political leaders from Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Mali, and Tanzania) to be vigilant in the neo-liberal discourse of globalization because it may perpetuate the benefits to only a small number of elites like themselves. Perhaps we might call it the Dhlomo effect. Dr. Oscar Dhlomo is a good example of the type of elite who would benefit most from this type of neo-liberal engagement (Moore 2001).

During the United States (US) Presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan (1981-89) and George Bush, Sr. (1989-92), US investment in the South African economy had a political and economic phase, i.e., funding for private sector investment initiatives and appeasing the Inkatha Freedom Party’s objectives of dismantling apartheid. Oscar Dhlomo benefited when he left his minister post of the “KwaZulu ‘homeland’ Department of Education to facilitate meetings among the leaders of the contesting parties in order to reduce the violence and to work toward a smoothly functioning democratic system” (Moore 2001, p. 922). Political violence is often part of the transition phase of democracy, and only one indicator of the transition. Moore goes on to say “He (Dhlomo) sold the idea of an organization to perform such a function to Hank Cohen, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in the State Department at that time.” Moreover, “Cohen gave him a letter that guaranteed him funding of five million rand a year to take to the USAID office in Pretoria” (South Africa). “Thus was born the Institute for the Multi-Party Democracy (IMPD) and the renewed career of a man who would play a key role, as member of the Independent Electoral Commission....” Moore concludes, “That Dhlomo now directs Durban’s (South Africa) first casino may bolster arguments that this sort of aid promotes a new bourgeoisie and a politics to match it...” (p. 922).

Therefore, the types of general patterns of institutional choices that the political elites of Africa, the Middle East and Mexico are subscribing to, include the following: capitulating (or co-opted) to the whims of the Western powers for short-term economic gain (a type of economic “end of history” ideology); willingness to use coercion (and repression) as a tool to control and manipulate; political elites’ maintenance of coalitions that may not have an interest in democratization (but support economic liberalization because of self-interest); political elites’ maintenance of dependent distributional coalitions (which can partake in economic windfalls as long as they are politically loyal); and partial reform polices to appease international financial donors such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. However, despite these worthy economic liberalization reforms to accommodate the ever-growing demands of globalization, why have North Africa and a majority of the Middle East experienced very little political liberalization vis-à-vis poorer sub-Saharan countries with increasing political liberalization? To answer that question, we must investigate more closely the linkage between political elite institutional choices and the impact of globalization.

Globalization, also known as free trade with minimal barriers to access markets, liberal trade policies, international movement of transnational capital, goods, and labor, the hegemony of neo-liberal economic policies, and minimal state involvement in the exchange of those goods and services, that is, laissez-faire capitalism. Castells (1997) warns us that globalization undermines state-power (especially in “developing” countries), and any attempts at reconstructing national identities are also sabotaged by the forces of globalization. In short, globalization is the new form of imperialism. V.I. Lenin advised that capitalism is the highest form of imperialism. Globalization in many ways reduces the economic and political sovereignty of nation-states. Globalization does this by being hostile to protective markets, tariff measures, protective legislation, executive mandates, and so on. Globalization means that you must “play” by the rules regardless of your economic position vis-à-vis other countries’ competitive edge. The barriers to free trade are viewed with disdain and are a bane to economic development. Globalization means that political elites’ institutional choices have to be tailored in such a way that the political systems tend to become heavily bureaucratized in order to meet the economic requirements to “play” in the global marketplace of goods and services. Furthermore, political elites’ institutional choices are focused on the management and execution of national polices which must coincide with International Financial Institution (IFI) demands, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, coupled with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Globalization tends to focus more on political stability (Alkadry 2002) (rather than democratization), which can mean authoritarianism at worst, or pseudo-democracy, illiberal democracy (Alianak 2004) at best.

Globalization, coupled with the seemingly never-ending political and military instability in many parts of Africa, the Middle East and Mexico means that political elites’ institutional choices will have to attempt to abate such realities. A caveat, Lupo (2004) warns us, political violence may temporarily inhibit democracy (like other potential characteristics such as elite noncompliance and elite reception of radicals). Likewise, military expenditures continue to drain Middle Eastern budgets. In fact, on average, Middle Eastern countries devote a greater proportion of their gross domestic product to military purchases than any other region in the world (Henry 2003). The following are typical theoretical models of globalization manifested in the industrialized West and the “developing” world. These basic models provide a framework for my data, findings and discussion.

Western Model of Globalization

Globalization (domestic economic liberalization policies; increased free trade; FDI)

perpetuated by...

Anti-Statist Institutional Policy Choices by Political & Economic Elites

this acts as a liaison to...

Augment Democratic Consolidation (Maturation)

“ Developing” State Model of Globalization

Globalization (includes the above as well as IFI measures, such as structural adjustment programs (SAPs); primitive accumulation, e.g., white settlers taking (stealing) land from native African peasant farmers as was the case in colonial Rhodesia (now called Zambia and Zimbabwe; defensive modernization to protect certain precious commodities like oil)

stimulated by...

Statist Institutional Policy Choices by Political Elites (includes social & economic justice outcomes), which acts as a liaison to either augment or mitigate democratic maturation.

INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES AND THE POLITICAL ELITE IN MEXICO

Institutional changes played an enormous role in the transition to democracy in Mexico. As mentioned before in this paper, institutions help constrain those innate human impulses. There are two ways to acquire power, one is via the use of force and violence and the other one is the institutional approach based on legal measures and legitimating the electoral processes (Castellanos Hernandez, 2004). The latter approach has been taken in Mexico since 1990 with the creation of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and the Federal Electoral Court (TRIFE), the two main institutions which aim to protect against electoral fraud for a democratic maturation (Becerra, 2000).

The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) is an independent institution in charge of summons elections and has the power to sanction political parties that do not comply with the electoral process (Aboites Aguilar, 2004). Though, the independent characteristic is questioned, because the electoral advisors are citizens appointed indeed by the parties (Covian Andrade, 2001).

The Federal Electoral Court released relevant criteria about the electoral process in 1994, contributing to the democratic transition (Molina, 2005). Democracy in Mexico has had an effect over the judicial power, currently, the supreme court of justice is well known, before the democratic transition, few people knew that it existed (Ruiz Mondragón, 2006). However, there is a need to strengthen the judicial powers to be able to defend the citizens against abuse of power (Molina, 2005). Another area that is still weak is that the constitution does not establish minimal criteria such as education and experience for the representatives of Congress (Molina, 2005).

In 2003 the Federal Institute for Access to Public Information and a transparency law were created. This institution and the law were created with the purpose of encouraging accountability to citizens and to “contribute to the democratization of the Mexican society” (Relly, 2003, p.38; Torres Hernandez, 2005). The right of information should be guaranteed by the state, but in Mexico there was no regulated way of obligating the government to provide information. The Mexican Congress approved a $21.5 million annual budget for the institute, which will review appeal cases from petitioners who are denied information (Relly, 2003).

GLOBALIZATION AND MEXICO

Trade liberalization and integration into the world economy in Mexico started in the 1980s. The international economic openness contributed to change in Mexican society, altering internal behavior and culture to some degree (Ojeda Gomez, 2005). Mexico decided to focus on globalization and the private sector of the economy, putting an end to the public and nationalistic approach. In 1994, Mexico entered NAFTA becoming a trade partner of United States and Canada. The United States has always been interested in a stable Mexico, but with NAFTA the concerns increased, since its economy became vulnerable to Mexican instability. Mexico got restricted by becoming part of different trade alliances, and national issues got invaded by international topics such as diplomacy, security and strategy (Valades, 2001). Foreign pressure to ensure democracy from countries, NGOs, international organizations and the United Nations increased in the 1990s. In 1994, United Nations representatives attended the presidential elections as observers; it was the first time that non- Mexican citizens were allowed in the process. In 1998, an NGO from Italy sent representatives as observers to another electoral process (Ortega, 2001). However, with the focus on the private sector and the increase of the power of free enterprise, business elites became the political elite. This new elite became the most politically influential group (Ortega, 2001). In 2000, Mexico achieved international recognition for its effort to become democratic, thus these efforts had a clear impact on the economy. For example, that year, the first of the presidential transition, the foreign direct investment increased 22% (Excelsior, 2000; Ojeda Gomez, 2005).

Several NGOs appeared in the 1990s with the aim of guarding human rights in Mexico (Aboites Aguilar, 2004). The NGOs have the capacity to mobilize media in their favor, and media has big influence in the creation and destruction of political image. In Mexico, NGOs have limited the government’s freedom of action, as mentioned once by the ex-president of Ecuador Rodrigo Boria “The national state has been overflown by globalization” (Ojeda Gomez, 2005, p. 129). The Organization of American States (OAS) also participated in Mexico guarding human rights. Another milestone in Mexico’s engagement in globalization was becoming a trade partner of the European Union, which meant a furtherance of stimulating democracy towards human rights and to ensure that it was respected. Human rights defense would serve as an anchor to guarantee political transition (Ortega, 2001; Ojeda Gomez, 2005). Thanks to globalization, political parties are internationalizing, that is, parties are seeking international support in the United States, with its vast Mexican immigrant population. Also, in 1994 an initiative to allow Mexicans living abroad to vote was proposed and in 2000 it was approved that Mexicans living in the United States could vote for the 2000 presidential election. The “internationalizing” of political parties meant an extension of their campaigns abroad and consulates were in charge of guaranteeing voting and a fair electoral process abroad. This was a major change towards democracy, in view of the fact that not allowing nationals living abroad to vote was considered political discrimination (Ojeda Gomez, 2005).

FINDINGS: THE CASE OF MEXICO

According to Marshall and Jaggers (2003) Mexico’s polity and democratic index is 8 out of 10, in other words, Mexico is considered a democratic country. Another index is formulated by the United Nations Development Programme, the index variables are right to vote, fair and free elections, access to participation in the political process among others. In a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is considered a fully democratic government, Mexico showed a 0.80 in 2002. It is important to notice that in 1960 Mexico got a score of 0.40 for the same parameter, so the efforts toward becoming a democracy are visible (PNUD, 2002; Torres Hernández, 2005). However, according to the Freedom House Organization, to qualify as a free country and to be considered democratic there are four requirements: 1) freedom of speech and beliefs, 2) freedom of association, 3) state of law, and 4) personal autonomy and individual rights. It is clear that Mexico qualifies for the first two, but it is arguable if it can qualify for the other (Molina, 2005). Also, when one discusses democracy in Mexico, there is no distinction between political democracy and social democracy (Covian Andrade, 2001). There is a misconception of democracy, it is only considered in the political sense, limited to the fight for power between parties, but social democracy is not considered. The social conditions of the majority of the population have not improved with the political transition, the percentage of population living under poverty only decreased by 2% since 2000.

OVERALL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The primary goal of this paper is to identify information in regard to institutional choices that political elites in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico perhaps should consider which will perchance generate democratic maturation. Institutional choices might mean deregulating participation, i.e., increasing who can participate in the political process, the pluralist notion. Institutional choice may also mean maximizing executive restraints so as to minimize the chances for autocratic rule and corruption, which will increase the chance for the institutionalization of democracy. After all, corrupt behavior in public office is based on a monopoly of power coupled with indiscretion, where there is no accountability, nor transparency. That is, which institutional choices are necessary (although not sufficient) to ensure democratic maturation? Moreover, what are the institutional choices that political elites in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico should seriously consider if they are earnest about democratic consolidation?

Hypotheses

H1: African, Middle Eastern countries and Mexican political elites that are making the transition to democracy, while deciding institutional choices, are more likely to institutionalize or consolidate democracy if there is less regulation of who can participate in the political process. Less regulation in the participatory process should lead to more competition, more viable choices for voters, thus more competitive politics.

H2: Political elites in African, Middle Eastern countries and Mexico that are making the transition to democracy are more likely to institutionalize democracy if there are more constraints on executives. More constraints on the executives will help minimize the chances for corruption, and autocratic rule (especially in nascent democratic systems). More executive constraint should lead to more competition and recruitment of viable executives in the political process, thereby facilitating democratic consolidation.

METHODOLOGY

In order to test the significance and provide preliminary evidence of the relevance of institutional choice and the related hypotheses, some partial regression plots and correlations were employed to quantitatively investigate the years 1960-2000. The forty years will allow trends regarding institutional choices to be analyzed over time.

Case Selection

The Polity IV data set by Marshall and Jaggers (2002) was used and included most (50 out of 54) African countries and all 14 Middle Eastern countries and Mexico. There are 437 cases in the sample, over a forty-year period (1960-2000).

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the institutionalized democracy score, i.e., the level of democratic consolidation or maturation. The democracy score based on the Marshall & Jaggers (2002) scale, indicates the general openness of political institutions. The eleven point democracy scale is constructed additively, based on the autocracy score (general closed nature of political institutions) and the polity score (computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score). Autocracies tend to be more insulated, that is, as the insulation of the autocrat or chief executive increases, so too does the autocracy score.

Independent Variables

In order to evaluate the level of democratization, the Polity IV data set was used. Marshall and Jaggers (2002) combined annual measures of the regulation and competitiveness of participation, the constraints on executives, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the polity score to create an eleven-point scale. The eleven point scale was used to depict the country’s democratic and autocratic characteristics. The regulations of executive recruitment are the institutionalized procedures regarding the transfer of executive power. That is, the openness of the executive recruitment determines the extent to which any eligible (e.g., minimum age and citizenship requirements) citizen has an opportunity (at least in principle), to attain the position of executive through a periodic process. The competitiveness of the executive recruitment is the extent to which executives are chosen through competitive elections. The openness of executive recruitment is the opportunity for non-elites to attain executive office. The executive constraint variable is the operational (de facto) independence of the chief executive (e.g., president, prime minister, premier). The regulation of participation indicates the level of development of the institutional structures for political expression by the populace.

Lastly, the competitiveness of participation variable indicates the extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression (e.g., free speech, freedom to assemble, protest). The democratic and autocratic characteristics were then combined to produce a third indicator. The polity (country) score, which is derived by subtracting the autocratic score from the democratic score. Thus, this score produces a single regime score which ranges from a +10 (fully democratic characteristics) to a -10 (fully autocratic characteristics). This polity score indicator was used to operationalize the institutionalization or consolidation of democracy, i.e., level of democratization.

Findings

Partial Regression Plots about Here

In order to provide preliminary statistical significance to institutional choice and related hypotheses, regression analysis and correlations were conducted. There were statistical significance and strong associations between the institutional choices with the following independent variables: competitiveness of participation, regulation of participation, executive constraints, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the polity score vis-à-vis the dependent variable of institutionalized democracy. For example, the partial regression plot of the competitiveness of participation clearly indicated that institutional choices by political elites that engender more participation in the political process will increase the chances for democratic consolidation. Institutional choices such as opening up the process of whom actually can participate, less rigid voting requirements, no nepotism or inner circle requirements, and no socioeconomic status requirements should all help augment the chances for institutionalizing democracy in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico, and more generally in nascent democracies.

Conversely, the partial regression plot of the regulation of participation and institutionalizing democracy illustrated that the more restraints on who can participate and how they can participate, mitigates the chances for democratic consolidation. Thus, political elites in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico should seriously consider institutional choices which generate more participation, that is, fewer regulatory measures of participation. In terms of executive constraints, there is clear evidence that increasing political executive restraints so as to mitigate autocratic tendencies and dictatorial rule enhances the chances for institutionalizing democracy. Allowing political executives some latitude to rule is obviously a necessary condition (although not sufficient) for a functioning viable democracy. However, too much executive power is antithetical to democratic rule, like too much legislative and judicial power. There has to be a compromise or balance of power between the agents or branches of government for democracy to not only prevail but become entrenched. Likewise, there has to a competitive environment for political executive recruitment so that there is a diversity of challengers in the political process each vying for a role in the democratic process. Thus, there is strong evidence as indicated in the partial regression plot that illustrates as the competitiveness of executive recruitment increases, so too does the institutionalization of democracy.

Lastly, in terms of the partial regression plot of the polity score and institutionalization of democracy, the plot illustrates as the polity score increases, so too does democratic consolidation. The polity score is derived by subtracting the autocratic score from the democratic score. Thus, this score produces a single regime score which ranges from a +10 (fully democratic characteristics) to a -10 (fully autocratic characteristics). That is, the higher the polity score, the higher the institutionalization of democracy in a country.

Conclusions for Mexico

Mexican transition to democracy has come through a series of changes in laws, free elections and government transformation, however many still consider Mexico under an authoritarian government. The polity and democratic index considers Mexico a democracy, but many data presented throughout the paper confirms that it is still in transformation. There are still several problems that Mexico is facing in its transition toward democracy such as ungovernability, inefficient institutions, fragile civil participation and corruption (Torres Hernandez, 2005). Mexico needs to leave behind the paternalistic approach, needs to integrate active and responsible citizens to be able to face globalization and become a full democracy.

Correlations about Here

The correlations of the above variables in this study were statistically significant, the strength of the association between the independent variables and dependent variable (institutionalized democracy) was robust and the direction was positive. All correlations are statistically significant, the majority at the .01 level, and only one (regulation of participation and competitiveness of participation at the .05 level). The most statistically significant correlation at the .01 level in regard to the dependent variable (institutionalized democracy) is the association with executive constraints (.871**). This illustrates once again (as evidenced by the partial regression plots), that constraining political executives’ ability to have a carte blanche in their powers is a necessary condition for a viable, consolidated democracy, as opposed to an autocracy or military rule.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS and IMPLICATIONS

This paper provides baseline research in the area of political elites and institutional choices in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico. Moreover, the research provides at least a starting point inside as well as outside of Africa, the Middle East and Mexico when assessing the variables that impact democratization. Feasible institutional choices attempt to complement the usual suspects of democratic consolidation, e.g., “adequate” levels of wealth, and high educational levels.

Additionally, this paper has illustrated that political elites in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico can help foster democracy by facilitating electoral rules that will augment participation. Increasing levels of participation regardless of ethnicity, class, religion, and socioeconomic status should be paramount in any discussion on democratic consolidation. Moreover, mitigating ethnic, class, religious, and socioeconomic cleavages with institutional choices involving proportionality, as opposed to majoritarian rules might help appease majority as well as minority groups. Institutional choices by political elites in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico in the midst of “push and pull” factors of globalization such as free trade and structural adjustment programs in order to compete, might include more coalition building, instead of the more contentious Western, majoritarian “winner-take-all” system. A zero-sum political system whereby political elites and other vested parties either win or lose leaves no room for alleviating conducive dialogue between already historically contentious groups, especially in nascent democracies.

This paper has provided data on the salience of increasing participation, constraining executives and creating institutional rules that facilitate notions of democracy, in the thick of the stresses of globalization. Future research in the area of political elite institutional choices in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico should consider linking civil society actors with the elites to develop better partnerships which enhance democratic maturation, and sustainable social, political and economic development. Additionally, future research should consider if parliamentary (e.g. England and Thailand), presidential (e.g., the United States and the Philippines), or semi-presidential (e.g., France and South Korea) systems are genuinely achievable in post-colonial Africa, the Middle East and Mexico. Perhaps, such democratic models are unrealistic or antithetical to nation and state-building in such societies. Further, what political and economic costs are involved in the era of increased globalization, not only for political elites in Africa, the Middle East and Mexico, but for the general populations? Lastly, democratization studies must seriously consider nonlinear models of democracy if we are to capture the varying possibilities of democratic rule and sustainable development in the twenty-first century and beyond.

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