Abstract

Turkey is at the crossroads of Europe and several volatile, strategically and economically important regions, including Russia, the Caspian region and the Middle East. The essay argues that Turkey's energy policy can supply Turkey and other western countries with energy while fostering important international relations among allies and neighbours. Turkey is located right in the middle of the biggest oil and natural gas deposits in the world, namely the Caspian and Gulf region; yet it is not blessed with its own resources and imports 60% of its energy consumption. The Turkish government predicts that energy needs will increase 10% a year for the next 20 years. The energy need of the industrialized world is little less. Turkey could serve as distribution hub with regard to future pipeline projects.

Introduction

The subject matter of this essay is focused on Turkey's energy policy and the role it plays in Turkey's foreign policy and the international relations of its allies and neighbours.

The gap in Turkey's energy supply and demand is the key element which determines Turkey's energy policy. As a country with an emerging and rapidly growing economy, Turkey at the same time is facing a rising growth in its demand for energy.

The essay addresses the question “Does Turkey's energy policy efficiently address domestic and foreign energy needs.” This raises the further question “Why does Turkey's energy policy influence its foreign policy and promote the interests of its allies and neighbours?” Addressing these questions is important as Turkey's and the western industries' energy needs increase and cannot be regarded and solved without consideration of the international relations between and among the parties that are involved. That, not only, but also Turkey's foreign policy (in the context of energy policy and world international relations) is of high importance, especially to the energy seeking western countries, can be seen in the war against Saddam Hussein.

Energy has emerged as an important factor influencing Turkish internal and foreign policy. Turkey's increasing energy needs have given Turkey a strong interest in developing ties with Russia and energy producing countries in the Middle East and the Caspian Region.

Turkey's relations with the United States have witnessed important changes during the last years. Turkey's increasing involvement in the Middle East has increased Turkey's strategic importance in Washington. The United States have come to see Turkey as a key ally and a more capable actor in the Middle East regions. In addition, the war on terrorism and the United States´ desire to bolster moderate voices in the Muslim world, have reinforced Turkey's strategic importance to the United States.

Turkey's relations with Europe are undergoing important changes. At its December 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU decided to accept Turkey as a candidate for membership. Since then, Turkey has undertaken a number of important reforms designed to meet the EU's Copenhagen criteria.

The issues raised will be addressed by an analysis and evaluation of Turkey's energy and foreign policy and the coherent international relations of its allies and neighbours.

The article's conclusion is that Turkey efficiently addresses domestic as well as foreign energy needs and economic interests of energy supplying countries, while at the same time is providing a foreign policy which is able to foster and stabilise international relations and interests.

Turkey'S Energy Policy

Turkey'S Domestic Energy Need and Policy

As Turkey's economy has expanded in the last years, the consumption of oil has increased. The expected growth rate in oil consumption is expected to continue at a rate of about 2-3% per year. Turkey's oil consumption in 1998 was 76 million tonnes of oil equivalent. It is expected to reach 179 mtoe in 2010 and 319 in 2020.1 The 20 billion cubic feet of natural gas being produced in Turkey in 2000 met only 3.8% of domestic gas consumption. The remaining gas consumption was either imported by pipelines or as liquified natural gas. Turkey's natural gas consumption is expected to grow rapidly, quadrupling within the next 20 years, with 1,400 bcf gas consumption projected for the year 2020.2

While access to oil supply, is easier to obtain for Turkey, mainly coming via tankers from Libya and Algeria, the supply of natural gas is a more vexing problem. Turkey is the fastest growing gas market in Europe and had difficulties in the past years to satisfy its domestic demand. The importance of gas supply for Turkey has driven Turkey to pursue signing a couple of agreements to purchase gas from Russia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran and even Iraq, all requiring new pipeline infrastructure.

Turkey and Russia

Russia has traditionally been Turkey's largest gas supplier. The 842 km Russia-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline transports gas from Russia through Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria into Turkey. Given its need to meet growing domestic consumption, Turkey has sought to increase these quantities significantly. Thus, the $3.3 billion Blue Stream Pipeline was jointly built by Russia's Gazprom and Italy's ENI, each having a 50% share. The Blue Stream Pipeline partly runs under the Black Sea and shall finally deliver 565 bcf of natural gas annually from 2009 onwards. Russia also delivers oil to Turkey which is transported via pipeline.

Turkey and the Caspian Region

The Caspian region's oil and gas reserves have attracted many oil companies, ever since the fall of the Soviet Union made their development possible. While the region cannot rival the Persian Gulf's 60% of the proven global oil reserves, the Caspian region's estimated 15–40 billion barrels of oil reserves are still significant and have motivated the Caspian countries, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and international oil companies to embark on development projects. In 1998, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to build an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea, Baku (Azerbaijan) via Tbilisi (Georgia) to Ceyhan (Turkey). This pipeline would carry 1 million barrels of oil per day. Construction of the BTC Pipeline began in September 2002 and it is expected to be completed within the next three years. Turkmenistan hopes to transport 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year through the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, with 16 bcm per year going to the Turkish market and 14 bcm per year going through Turkey to Europe. Oil production at the coast of Kazakhstan at Kashagan is not expected to produce until 2005 at the earliest.3

Turkey and the Middle East

Iran is considered to be an attractive export route for both oil and gas. It already has a well-developed oil and gas transportation infrastructure, including portions of pipeline that could be used for various routes to the west. Important barriers to pipelines via Iran are sanctions by the US and its unreliability in times of crises. To sustain its current economic growth, Turkey in 1996 signed a deal with Iran to purchase $23 billion worth of gas over the next two decades, making Iran Turkey's second-largest gas supplier after Russia. The $23 billion gas deal with Iran is in conflict with US policy to avoid bringing Iran into any of the region's emerging commodity and economic web of agreements. The sum of $23 billion circumvents the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanction Act, which punishes companies investing more than $20 million in either country. As the agreement was signed under the conductorship of prime minister Islamist Erbakan, many feared it to be an indication of political change. However, it should be noticed that the agreement had been negotiated for some time before Erbakan became prime minister, and was a reflection of Turkey's energy needs rather than a sharp turn in foreign policy.4 Turkey has also signed contracts for energy imports with Egypt and Iraq.

Turkey as Distribution Hub for the West

The Energy Needs of the Western Industrialized World

Turkey represents the most promising target market for gas in southwest Asia. Its potential suppliers are just as eager to supply their gas to Turkey as Turkey is to receive it, and it is unlikely for all gas pipeline projects to win the Turkish gas market race unless connections to the European gas market are created.5

Western Europe energy consumption increased by 8.5 quadrillion Btu between 1992 and 2001. The increase was led by natural gas, 4.9 quadrillion Btu, petroleum, 2.0 quadrillion Btu, and nuclear electric power, 1.3 quadrillion Btu, which together more than offset a 1.3 quadrillion Btu decrease in coal consumption. In 2030 Europe will have to import 95% of its oil and gas consumption if production methods and consumption habits remain the same as today.6 Turkey's energy policy overlaps with EU's energy security policy and thus opens a further area for cooperation between Turkey and the EU. Greece, for instance, agreed with Turkey to transfer natural gas from the Caspian and Eurasian region to Europe, through Turkey and Greece.7

Turkey'S Energy Transmission Infrastructure

There are several existing oil and gas pipelines going through Turkey: the Ceyhan-Kirikkale Crude Oil Pipeline, for instance, transporting approximately 25 million barrels oil per year, the Batman-Dörtyol Crude Oil Pipeline which goes from the Batman area to the Bay of Iskenderun, carrying about 24 million barrels crude oil annually and the Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline, running from Kirkuk, Iraq, to Ceyhan, Turkey, transporting 286 million barrels of oil in 2000. Much of Turkey's future oil supply will come via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, carrying 1 million barrels of oil per day.

Several new pipelines, e.g. the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, and extensions of existing pipelines, e.g. as the extension of the Iran Natural Gas Pipeline in future connecting Greece with Turkey, are planned or under construction.8 The pipeline structure connecting the Caspian Sea basin reserves with the Mediterranean and European countries, will offer the most direct, cheapest, technologically and environmentally best option for transporting oil as well as gas over Turkey to Europe.

Turkey'S Foreign Policy

Turkey's foreign policy objectives are defined by its history, geography, international interests, international obligations and commitments. Ever since its establishment in 1925, the Republic of Turkey pursued foreign policy based on the principle “Peace at home and peace in the world”. Turkey became a founding member of the UN in 1945 and joined the Council of Europe in 1949. As a result of the growing threats to security in Europe, she joined the NATO alliance in 1952. In 1963, Turkey became a forerunner of the EU. Turkey is a member of the OSCE, the OECD, the BSEC, the OIC and the ECO.

Turkey and Russia

Russia, whose relations with Turkey date back centuries ago, has always been an important neighbour. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation marked a new era of Turkish-Russian relations. Good neighbourliness, mutual trust, friendship and cooperation in peace, stability and economic matters, form the basis of Turkish-Russian relations. Reciprocal official visits between Turkey and the Russian Federation are strengthening bilateral relations. The signing of ‘The Action Plan of Cooperation between Turkey and the Russian Federation in Eurasia’ on 16 Novemeber 2001 in New York give proof of this relationship. The Blue Stream Pipeline constitutes one of the most important issues in Turkish-Russian relations.9

Turkey and the Caspian Region

Turkey, which is one of the biggest investors in the Caspian region, has close historical, cultural and economic ties with the region and acts not only due to its commercial interests but also feels responsible for supporting the Caspian nations in their social and economic development. The efforts of the trans-Caspian nations to bypass Russia when transporting hydrocarbons, has led to the emergence of Turkey as a dominant player in the export of Caspian oil and gas. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline became a priority of Turkish policy towards the Caspian region and an important issue of Turkish foreign policy, in which Russia will be bypassed in favour of Georgia to get Caspian oil to the Black Sea. Azerbaijan has taken a view steps away from the unrestrained anti-Russian and pro-US and pro-NATO stance it had previously displayed, and the same is the fact to a limited extent in Georgia as well. These two states continue to see Russia as a threat to their independence, yet, as a threat that must be dealt with subtly. Their partnership with Turkey and the US is not immediately threatened, but both Azerbaijan and Georgia are recognizing that more flexibility and balance will be required in their relation with the new Russia. This had pitted Turkey against Russia and polarized the political relations of the Caucasus. Turkey has been supported by the US in the region and appealed to Israel to solidify its pro western position. As a result, a bloc consisting of Turkey, Israel, Azerbaijan, and Georgia has been formed and is counterbalanced by a Russo-Iranian-American alliance.10

Turkey and the Middle East

Turkey enjoys historical, cultural and traditional ties with the countries of the Middle East and maintains cordial relations with all countries of the region. Turkey supports every effort aimed at bringing about a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Turkey feels united to Israel by strategic bonds, and over the last decade, Turkey has become an important regional actor in the Middle East Peace Process.11 Bilateral relations with its neighbours Syria, Iraq and Iran focus on fighting against the PKK and the Kurdish question. Turkey maintains relations with the Kurdish PUK faction of Talabani and the KDP of Barzani. Relations with Syria in particular have been overshadowed by the water issue in the past.

The terrorist attacks perpetrated against the US on September 11 have demonstrated the severity of threat that terrorism poses to mankind, and underlined the solidarity and concert international action in the global fight against terrorism. Turkey was amongst the very first to join the global coalition that has been mobilized. Turkey is of the opinion that terrorism cannot be associated with a religion, culture, geography or ethnic group. Terrorist organizations exist everywhere in the world; therefore, the fight against terrorism is the common aim of the civilized world.12 Terrorist attacks also frighten pipelines. This could be the case with pipelines going through Azerbaijan and Georgia which are politically unstable. Also, Kurdish rebellion groups that could easily burst out into a civil war are a threat to pipelines going through Kurdish regions.13

Turkey and the EC

Turkey has been part of the European state system since the 19 th century when the Ottoman Empire was included in the Concert of Europe. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1856, Europe's great powers decided that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire was essential for European stability. Turkey, on the other side, became the Turkish Republic in 1923 and Atatürk introduced a series of reforms designed to transform Turkey into a modern, secular state.14 This process of gradual Europeanization was given new impetus after World War II by Turkey's entry into NATO. In 1963, Turkey signed the Association Agreement with the EC which foresaw the possibility of eventual membership. Meanwhile, Turkey's full membership to the EC has been a primary objective of Turkey's foreign policy. The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 introduced a new area in Turkish-European relations. In 2000, the EC Council approved an Accession Partnership Agreement which includes preparations that Turkey must match for becoming an EC member country. Since then, many reforms have been undertaken by Turkey. Yet, in October 2002, the EC made clear that Turkey has to do further reforms becoming a member. The EC will decide whether to start membership talks with Turkey from the end of 2004.

Developments within the EC will also be important. A slowdown in the EC integration process could negatively affect Turkey's economy and provoke a domestic backlash.15

Turkey and the US

Turkey and the US maintain a tight relationship, which is good for the US because it supports US interests in the region. Throughout the Cold War, the Turkish military was on the front lines of NATO's confrontation with the Soviet Union and Turkey's importance grew after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Turkey worked together with the US during the Kosovo crises, having been at the forefront of NATO's operations. Turkey deployed over 2,000 troops to the Balkan region as a member of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR. In 1999, Turkey supported the US in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. In the Middle East, Turkey has actively supported US mediation efforts between Israel and the Palestinians before and after Camp David.16

There has been effective and significant cooperation between the United States and Turkey during the past decade with regard to Iraq. Turkey demonstrated solidarity with the United States after the invasion of Kuweit in 1990 by shutting off Iraqi oil exports through Turkey and permitting US air strikes from the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey.17

The fact that US and world energy dependency on the Middle East is growing significantly, made energy catapult to the top of bilateral cooperation between Turkey and the US. This step was even more favoured by the Americans than the Turks, but, as energy is also Turkey's top priority in international relations, it was embraced by the Turkish side. The US, worrying about Russian-Iranian cooperation in any field, particularly supported the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Both countries, the US and Turkey, have been working together for a Eurasian transit corridor to export oil and gas resources from the Caspian region to Europe.18

Turkey, an Important Partner for the West – More Than Ever

Turkey stands at the nexus of three areas of increasing strategic importance both with regard to energy and foreign policy to the United States and Europe: The Balkans, the Caspian region and the Middle East.

With regard to the Baku-Tbilisi-Cryhan Pipeline, Greek Tsochadzopoulos stated:”We are following a regional collective security policy. Such a policy necessitates the endeavour of all countries from the Middle East to Central Asia. We can call this strategy energy diplomacy instead of defence diplomacy. Naturally, such a project can bring stability to the region. The development of the economic and trade relations in the region are also developments bringing stability.”19 The Baku-Tbilis-Ceyhan pipeline would connect Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey as oil exporters to international markets, while bypassing two regional powers, Iran and Russia. Azerbaijan too, stated that exporting oil via NATO member Turkey would bring additional political and security benefits to the region. The pipeline projects linking the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe will be essential for the region's integration to the West.20

In the past, Turkey has also emerged as an increasingly important regional actor with regard to foreign policy in Middle East issues. Since the September 11 attacks, NATO shows greater concerns for threats beyond Europe's borders and Turkey's position on the periphery of the Middle East enhances its strategic importance.21 After Iraq, a strong and stable Turkey will be more important than ever, both with regard to energy and foreign policy:

Russia's decision to oppose the US invasion of Iraq surprised many in Washington, who had expected Russian support in exchange for the promise of economic gains once Saddam Hussein was ousted. A major factor dictating this decision was probably that Russia had not received enough in return for his post-9/11 co-operation. Russia saw the US presence in central Asia and the Caucasus and NATO's enlargement into the Baltics. That led to “xenophobic, anti-western feelings in the security services, the military and parts of the bureaucracy.”22

The war in Iraq will certainly have some adverse effect on US relations in the Islamic world. Less clear is how serious and lasting this impact will be. The impact will also be affected by the way the US handles the situation in post-war Iraq. If the US guarantees the survival of Iraq and its territorial integrity, and the US help with Iraq's economic and political revitalization, this would go a long way to dampen anti-US sentiments. The time it will take to achieve these goals and thus the duration of US military presence in Iraq will also impact on Muslim, especially Arab attitudes. However, if Iraq experiences a long period of turmoil, the risk of growing anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world will increase.

Should the war on Iraq lead to broader instability in the neighbouring areas, including Turkey and Iran and potentially Jordan, this would also inflame sentiment against the US.

The events of September 11 have served to strengthen the US-Turkish strategic partnership. Turkey has always seen a strong tie to Washington as an important component of its security. The US, in turn, has been one of Turkey's strongest allies and has been supportive of key Turkish energy priorities such as the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, the campaign against PKK terrorism and Turkey's quest for EC membership.23 Though Turkey did not allow the US to deploy 62,000 troops as a second front in the war with Iraq, Washington might still give Turkey enough aid to reassure markets that that would avoid a debt failure.24 The removal of Saddam Hussein and reshaping of Iraq by the US might even bring Turkey long-term benefits as the region could become more secure.25

Though the present Iraqi conflict has nothing to do with Israel26 , US efforts to end the crisis in Israeli-Palestinian relations will continue and at the same time reduce anti-US sentiments caused by the Iraq conflict. Turkey has been increasingly supportive in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. It is more important than ever to maintain and foster Turkish-US partnership and strengthen Turkey's role in the region.

Besides, Europe and the US have to consider, that, along with the western world, China will look out for future energy supply. China's domestic energy needs are expected to double to 21 million barrels of oil a day (16 per cent of the world's total demand) by 2020. Thus, an increasingly energy-hungry China could turn to Russia and the oil and gas producing countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. For China, this option would mean being less dependent on volatile Persian Gulf producers.27

Conclusion

If Turkey's neighbours and allies fail to take advantage of Turkey's energy and foreign policy, they will underestimate what Turkey’s energy and foreign policy is offering both with regard to global energy and peace balances. Here is how:

Does Turkey's energy policy efficiently address domestic and foreign energy needs?

Turkey imports 60% of its energy needs. Energy imports will rise to 70% in 2010 and to 80% in 2020.28 Turkey's growing energy needs have given Turkey a strong interest in developing closer ties to energy producing states of the Caspian region and the Middle East. It has been so active in negotiating new oil and natural gas contracts with Russia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran and even Iraq, that it has signed agreements to purchase volumes which might even exceed the existing optimistic demand forecasts and lead to a short-term oversaturation.

Turkey is not only a significant energy consumer. Turkey is geographically close to 70% of the world's proven oil and gas resources and thus a natural energy bridge between major oil producing areas in Russia, the Caspian Sea basin region and the Middle East on the one hand, and European consumer markets on the other hand. At the end of 2001, a gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey has gone into operation. The Blue Stream Gas Pipeline from Russia to Turkey as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline from the Caspian basin to Turkey are currently under construction. With the development of new oil and gas routes to bring Caspian and Middle Eastern supplies to world markets, Turkey is at the same time emerging as a key energy distributor, especially for Europe. The transportation oil and gas resources through the various pipelines going through Turkey will enable the European countries to diversify and secure their energy supply.

Why does Turkey's energy policy influence its foreign policy as well as promote the interests of its allies and neighbours?”

Establishing and maintaining friendly and mutually beneficial relations with all countries, promoting regional and international cooperation, resolving conflicts only through peaceful means, and contributing to regional and international peace, stability, security and prosperity have always been the primary objectives of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's strong trans-Atlantic ties and the special relationship it has with the US for more than fifty years, based on the solid foundation of long standing friendship and alliance, have matured, intensified and presently risen to the level of an enhanced partnership. The US and Turkey both have vital interests in promoting peace, stability and democratic values in Turkey itself as well as in the Middle East and Caspian regions. The close connection in the Kemalist outlook between internal stability and foreign policy is neither unusual nor new. Turkey's energy policy is therefore closely linked with its foreign policy and how Turkey evolves in both, is important to the United States and Europe.

With full US support, Turkey has sought to establish itself as the main Caspian export route. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on the other side, have seriously sought to develop and export their share of the Caspian's oil and gas resources in the past. They are practically the only major source of income for addressing their enormous economic problems.29 Apart from the economic gains, this status increases Turkey's political influence in the Caspian region and enhances Europeanization and westernization.

The awareness of the dangers inherent in periods of political instability and rapid change, like this is the case due to the current Iraq war, causes profound unease and apprehension. A destabilizing factor is the loss of control over political, economical and social developments.30 The EU and the US must not let this opportunity pass by; on the one hand it is a commercially profitable chance to supply their energy needs, on the other hand, regarded in the scope of world security and international relations, not taking this opportunity would crucially neglect stabilization and security, especially in the Middle East.

As pivotally located as it is, Turkey will therefore remain an important partner to Western, Russian, Caucasian and Middle Eastern energy and foreign policy initiatives. Its strategic partnership with the US, its prospective membership of the EC, its cultural, historical and geographical ties to Eurasia and the Middle East, make Turkey an irreplaceable partner on all regional energy and foreign policy matters.

Endnotes

1. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/.

2. An Energy Overview of the Republic of Turkey, Fossil Energy International, (7 January 2003), http://www.fe.doe.gov/international/turkover.html.

3. Ögütçü. M., Caspian Energy “Poker Game” and Turkey: Prospects for a New Approach, the journal, Vol.8, Art.5, CEPMLP, (6 April 2001), http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/article8-5.html.

4. Sasley, B., Turkey`s Energy Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vo.2, No.4 (1998).

5. Ögütçü. M., Caspian Energy “Poker Game” and Turkey: Prospects for a New Approach, the journal, Vol.8, Art.8, CEPMLP, (6 April 2001), http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/article8-5.html.

6. European Commission, Directorate General for Energy Policy.

7. Batur, N., Energy Diplomacy, Not Defense Diplomacy, Hurriyet, (25 March 2002).

8. An Energy Overview of the Republic of Turkey, Fossil Energy International, (7 January 2003), http://www.fe.doe.gov/international/turkover.html.

9. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Foreign Policy, (15 January 2003), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm.

10. Koslosky, R., Trans-Caspian Energy Relations in the Post-Soviet Era, University of Florida International Review, (March 2003), http://web.polisci.ufl.edu/UF_Review/Articles/trans.htm.

11. Barkey, H., Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey`s Role in the Middle East, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

12. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Foreign Policy, (15 January 2003), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm.

13. Peimani, H., Turkey and Caucasus: Pipeline politics play their course, Asia Times Online, (1 May 2002), http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/DE01Ag04.html.

14. Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 234 ff., (Oxford University Press, 1961).

15. Larrabee, F. and Lesser, I., Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, pp.68 ff, (Rand edt. 2003).

16. Statement of Ambassador Marc Grossman Director General of the Foreign Service House International Relations Subcommittee on International Organisations and Human Rights, (14 September 2000).

17. Aliriza, B., Turkey, Europe and the United States: Quo Vadis?, Turkey Update, (12 April 2002), Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://www.csis.org/turkey/TU020412.htm.

18. Energy – Through Great Cooperation, Not the ‘Great Game’, PULSE of Turkey No.3 (13 May 1998), http://www.turkpulse.com/energy.htm.

19. Batur, N., Energy Diplomacy, Not Defense Diplomacy, Hurriyet, (25 March 2002).

20. Baran, Z., From the Caspian to the Mediterranean: The East-West Energy Corridor is Becoming a Reality, In The National Interest, Vol.2, Issue 8 (2003).

21. Kardas, S., Turkish Daily News, (29 May 2002).

22. Cottrell, R., Strong leader strikes cool note in US relationship, Financial Times, World Report Russia, p. I, (1 April 2003).

23. Larrabee, F. and Lesser, I., Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, pp.68 ff, (Rand edt. 2003).

24. Boulton, L., A hopeful picture turned on its head, Financial Times, World Report, Turkey, p. I, (1 April 2003).

25. Candar, C., Turkey, the United States and Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies, (6 March 2002), http://www.csis.org/turkey/event020306.htm.

26. Gold, D., Israel should not pay the price for Iraq, Financial Times, p. 19, (1 April 2003).

27. Ögütç, M., Turkey`s Energy Policies in the Context of Eurasian Geopolitics, Caspian Studies Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002.

28. Energy – Through Great Cooperation, Not the ‘Great Game’, PULSE of Turkey No.3 (13 May 1998), http://www.turkpulse.com/energy.htm.

29. Peimani, H., Turkey and Caucasus: Pipeline politics play their course, Asia Times Online, (1 May 2002), http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/DE01Ag04.html.

30. Gilpin, R., War and Change in World Politics, pp. 233 ff..